

# THE ARMY

COMBAT FORCES

# JOURNAL

OCTOBER 1955

50¢

THE ARMY TEAM



## ANNUAL MEETING OF ASSOCIATION OF U. S. ARMY — FORT BENNING, 21-22 OCTOBER

**Enthusiasm is contagious**, and the enthusiasm that has been developed over the annual meeting of the Association at Fort Benning is slightly overwhelming. From Lt. Gen. Walter L. Weible, Chair of the Annual Meeting Committee, and Maj. Gen. Joseph H. Harper and his staff at Benning, down to the lowest man on the totem pole on the Association staff, all hands have gone on an overtime basis to make the meeting a bang up success. Plans for the meeting are certainly carrying out its theme—the Army Team. If the meeting carries it out half as well as it has been demonstrated among the various committees working on the arrangements, it will be a classic example of teamwork.

Every branch, service and component is represented by a working member on the three principal committees, in Washington and at Benning. As a result, the membership will have an opportunity to participate in a program of high professional interest that represents a truly team effort. It is no exaggeration to point out that this is one show that has something in it for everyone.

The meetings would have taken three days if all the displays, demonstrations and discussions that were suggested had been incorporated into the program. Consequently, the top-level coordinating committee had to select those which they felt would be of the greatest value and interest to the membership, and as you review the agenda you'll find that there are no wasted moments.

**We hope that members** attending will complete arrivals, registration and billeting prior to 1200 on 21 October. The program gets under way with a brief orientation in the display area at Lawton Field. The Army Aviation Center will then present an aerial demonstration which will include all types of Army aircraft, parachute troops, equipment drops, free falls, and various other items of aviation interest. Following the air show, there will be a drive-by demonstration of new and experimental motor vehi-

cles and equipment. When this is completed, the members attending will have an hour and 40 minutes to examine the displays developed by the various technical and administrative services, which will overflow the two large hangars at Lawton Field onto the large open runways adjacent thereto. There will be fourteen separate display areas in which more than 175 new and experimental items and services will be shown and/or demonstrated.

After a brief refreshment break, the membership will move to a demonstration area during which infantry troops at Fort Benning will participate in an attack problem supported by armor, artillery, and technical and administrative service units and personnel.

**The evening program** gets under way at 1845 with a reception at the Fort Benning Officers' Club, during which time an orchestra from the Women's Army Corps will provide the entertainment. The dinner will start at 2000. General Harper and the President of the Association will each speak briefly followed by the major address of the evening by the Secretary of the Army, Wilber M. Brucker.

**Promptly at 0830** on the 22d, we will gather at the Post Theater, at which time there will be a business meeting of the Association. During this period, members attending will have an opportunity to participate in plans for future Association endeavors.

After a short break, the members will reconvene in the Theater for a panel discussion by a group of senior Army planners and commanders on current and future problems and developments in the Army. This promises to be one of the highlights of the meeting.

General Maxwell D. Taylor, Chief of Staff of the Army, will close the morning session with an address which will likewise conclude the meeting.

It's a jam-packed twenty-four hours. You're invited—be there!

### CHAIRMAN



LT. GEN. W. L. WEIBLE  
Executive Council, AUSA

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"The Association of the U. S. Army shall be an organization wherein all who are in accord with its objectives may join in the exchange of ideas and information on military matters, and in fostering, supporting, and advocating the legitimate and proper role of the Army of the United States and of all its elements, branches, and components in providing for and assuring the Nation's military security."

## ASSOCIATION'S JOURNAL

JUST below the roster of our Executive Council, in the adjoining column, you will find a paragraph which appears in each issue of THE JOURNAL, outlining in general terms the aims and purposes of our Association.

Later this month, at Fort Benning, your Association will hold an annual meeting which for the first time has been developed into a program that will further contribute to "the exchange of ideas and information on military matters."

Each year for the past three years the number of pages of THE JOURNAL has been increased, which has broadened the coverage we are able to give to the whole range of subjects of professional interest to the membership. The past year has seen also a large increase in the requests for individual services which the Association is glad to render for the membership.

While these tangible proofs of continuing progress are of interest to the membership and encouraging to the staff, they represent only a sound beginning to the contribution which your Association can make to its members individually and to the Army as a whole.

THE measurement of your Association's future progress can be gauged in pretty specific terms. It depends almost entirely on how well the Association is supported by the individual members of the Army—in all ranks, branches, services and components. It isn't just a matter of dollars and cents, either—although, like all nonprofit associations without wealthy contributors, finances do limit our activities to a sensible business operation. A greatly broadened membership materially enhances our ability to meet our objectives by providing a greater range of ideas and editorial contributions; it develops a wider understanding and deeper appreciation of the important roles of all the various branches, services and components to the over-all Army team; it permits a more thorough coverage of the continually changing military scene; and it enables your Association to speak with greater authority on behalf of the Army.

Fortunately, we can report material progress in this direction, too. Since the first of May of this year, more than ten thousand new individual membership-subscriptions have been processed. Any publication would welcome an increase of 28 per cent in its paid subscribers in a period of five months, but as you review the objectives of our Association and JOURNAL, you will see readily that it represents an important step forward. If, with the active help of the membership, we can maintain a steady increase of members even approximating that of the past five months, your Association is well on its way to its objective of greater service to its individual members and to the Army as a whole. You can help most by urging your associates to get on the team.

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THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL



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The ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL is a professional military magazine devoted to the dissemination of information and ideas relating to the military art and science representing the interests of the entire Army. The ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL strives to—

Advance man's knowledge of warfare in the fields of strategy, tactics, logistics, operations, administration, weapons and weapons systems.

Advance man's knowledge and understanding of the soldier as an individual, as a member of a trained unit, and as a member of the whole Army; emphasizing leadership, esprit, loyalty, and a high sense of duty.

Disseminate knowledge of military history, especially articles that have application to current problems or foster tradition and create esprit.

Explain the important and vital role of the United States Army in the Nation's defense and show that the Army is alert to the challenges of new weapons, machines, and methods.

Advance the status of the soldier's profession.

(Adopted by the Executive Council of the Association of the U. S. Army, 21 June 1954)

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## THE MONTH'S MAIL

### *Touch Not That Song!*

● A recent newspaper item indicates a move on foot by someone to junk the words but keep the tune of the field artillery's "Caisson Song," by conducting a contest for new lyrics symbolic of the Army as a whole.

It is a noble and laudable effort to produce a marching song that the whole Army could proudly sing and play. But that is no justification for the appropriation from the artillery of its song. . . . Montgomery's Desert Rats captured in honorable combat the *Afrikakorps*'s haunting "Lili Marlene," but the Lord Jehovah reportedly visited punishment upon King David for taking unto himself Bath-sheba, the eye-filling wife of one of the loyal captains in his army.

\* \* \*

You might just as well start a movement to modernize certain branch insignia because various portions have become outmoded. Throw out the medieval castles of the Corps of Engineers! Replace them with crossed picks and shovels. Throw out the antique pistols of the Military Police! Replace them with Colts, automatic, caliber .45. Throw out the muskets of the Infantry! Replace them with crossed M1s or carbines, or even wait until it is decided just what the basic small-arms weapon of the Queen of Battles will finally be. Throw out the quill of the JAG! Replace it with a ball point pen. And so on, *ad nauseam*. Just cast tradition to the winds. *Sic transit gloria mundi!*

COL. MONTGOMERY C. JACKSON  
Hq RYCOM  
APO 331, San Francisco

### *Quemoy Reader*

● I have finally gotten what I crave. The day I received your May issue was just like a pay day. Among its articles, the "Mines" and "In China, Recon is for the Foot Soldier" gave me much help. But to be frankly, I have a little disappointed. The articles about tactics and strategy are somehow not very rich.

Would you kindly add some more articles pertaining to the tactics or strategy? I think that the small unit tactics in the atomic warfare will be much useful to lieutenants.

I am a rifle platoon leader holding my duty in Kinmen [Quemoy] where the point is now concentrated by the whole world. The Communists' frogmen, we call them sea-devils, always give us raids at night. Their object is to capture our sentries. We have learnt much experience in catching those sea-devils in the last few months.

LT. G-HAND CHANG  
Taiwan, Free China

### *Web Defense*

● Your treatment of Lt. Col. J. W. Edwards, author of "Web Defense" [June and August], was deplorable. An anonymous diatribe has no place in an ethical professional magazine which, supposedly, is on the market for articles of interest which stimulate thought and provoke interest. You have a "disclaimer" in your masthead. That is sufficient. There was no need for you to destroy Colonel Edwards's article with a piece-by-piece dissection by an unnamed "reader." Your editor selected the piece for publication, and your Association paid good money to the author. The dignity of an honest, thinking officer requires more than an unsigned criticism. Such treatment can only serve to discourage would-be contributors to your magazine by placing sincere writers in a position of ridicule.

CAPT. FRANK X. GOSS  
USMCR  
Wilmington, Del.

● As our readers are aware, the publication of unsigned articles is not uncommon in the military press. Therefore the absence of a signature to the "dissection" in the August issue was not unprecedented. It is a further fact that the credentials of the anonymous author were excellent, otherwise we would not have published his criticism. And finally, the reasons for the anonymity were good and sufficient. Our purpose in publishing articles such as Colonel Edwards's is to

stimulate thought and promote interest and discussion. When we do so, we are certainly obligated to give expression to those who were stimulated—in this case the anonymous author. Furthermore, the editors must point out that it wasn't Colonel Edwards who was attacked in the criticism, but his ideas and opinions. If those ideas and opinions are correct, the criticism will not destroy them, but should make them stronger.—THE EDITORS

### *Thank You, Sir*

● My compliments on THE JOURNAL for August. I thought it an unusually well balanced and varied array; I found much of interest and value to me personally.


Two items I liked especially were "Officer with AAA Group" and Captain Gard's letter to the editor. Many of the AAA units on guard around our big cities and key installations are obliged to devise for themselves new ways to maintain the proper standard of living. Much depends on the leadership of the local commanders. Captain Gard's letter is one I would like to have written myself, were I in his position.

GEN. W. B. PALMER  
Vice Chief of Staff  
Department of the Army  
Washington 25, D. C.

### *Management Is Leadership*

● In reading Colonel Waterman's article, "Don't Let Management Trick You," in the September issue, I was struck by several paragraphs which are intimately related to statements I have made before classes of the Command Management School at Fort Belvoir. These paragraphs and my remarks before the CMS are borne out by statements made in a recent letter to me from an intelligent, capable lieutenant colonel, now on duty as a commander with a field unit. The following quotation, extracted from his letter, indicates that good management is really and practically only another term for good leadership:

"... While in these assignments I tried to institute review and analysis,



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and succeeded only in performing this function for the winter maneuver. Lack of understanding, unwillingness to cooperate, and a feeling that review and analysis belong to the comptroller were the major factors contributing to my lack of success. This points up a requirement that all service schools should include R&A as a component part of instruction. Additional education is required.

"Having been away from troop duty for nine and a half years, it feels good to have a battalion. Since assuming command I have instituted review and analysis within the battalion. It pays off! I have facts and figures to back up arguments—and can foresee monthly trends. I can take corrective action before higher headquarters becomes aware of a deficiency trend.

"By asking *why* during analysis, those responsible for activities soon recognize deficiencies and take the necessary steps to have them corrected. Some things need review weekly, others monthly. But a picture together with a trend is portrayed on a quarterly basis.

"It takes a little effort to initiate, and explain the purpose of R&A at the battalion level—but once established, it is relatively easy to keep going. The batteries automatically begin to follow suit after the first month in order that they too may have the answer before battalion. Conducted on a very informal basis, everyone soon recognizes the help that

is provided through review and analysis."

It can be seen from these quotes that review and analysis, which is just a tool of management, is also a tool of leadership and is applicable even in the smallest of our organized combat units.

I believe that an understanding of this similarity will go a long way toward eliminating the present mental antagonism toward "management."

LT. GEN. WALTER L. WEIBLE  
Deputy Chief of Staff, O&A  
Department of the Army  
Washington 25, D. C.

#### *School of the Integrated Leader*

• I must take issue with Lieutenant Cedar's letter "Brains vs. Brawn" [August]. No one has yet managed to prove that either ranger or airborne training diminishes the mental ability or the leadership capability of those recently commissioned Regular Army lieutenants who have completed these courses. Rather, their mental outlook is broadened through new experience and their leadership is reinforced by confidence.

I look forward to the day when the advocates of both schools develop permanent laryngitis so that the more moderate exponents of the School of the Integrated Leader may make their voices heard.

The Battle of Marathon was not won by a distance runner, and the brilliance of the German General Staff failed to avert the Stalingrad disaster. So what?

So this: a leader must be many things. The qualities of a leader (amply covered in appropriate tests) are not mutually exclusive. The successful junior ground leader must be able to intelligently plan an attack. He must also be able to run up the hill with his men to insure that all is going according to his brilliantly conceived plan.

There is little more the Army can do to make a leader more intelligent than what Nature and environment have combined to create. However, it is within the Army's power to make a man stronger; to give him more stamina; to instill more confidence, and by doing so, make a better man, a better soldier, and a better officer out of him.

LT. PETER T. NOBLE  
Fort Benning, Ga.

#### *U.S. Military Doctrine*

• I note in your September issue that Major Strait Lace, in commenting on Mr. Carmen's review of *U. S. Military Doctrine*, by Brig. Gen. Dale O. Smith, deplores that you permitted "a civilian writer to call a general officer a 'huckster'." He suggests that such a comment degrades the author's rank.

Mr. Carmen did not degrade General Smith's rank. He gave an opinion of a book; this is a hazard every author must face, regardless of rank or status. The fact that Carmen is a civilian and Smith a military man is of no consequence.

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Having carefully read, and re-read, General Smith's book, I must admit I thought Mr. Carmen was rather restrained in his comments.

COL. T. N. DUPUY  
Cambridge, Mass.

### Off-Base Marine

• While reading "Defend From the Top of the Hill" in the August issue, I became confused when Captain Roe listed the "fire power" of a rifle company. I believe he used a Marine rifle company as his example. Latest data from The Infantry School show a rifle company has 119 M1s, not 170 as Captain Roe states; also that a rifle company has 18 BARs, not 27 as stated. I believe the "27 BARs" is derived from the BAR found in each Marine fire team of 4 men, 3 teams in each squad, 3 squads in each rifle platoon, and 3 rifle platoons in each Marine rifle company—a total of 27.

The one outstanding deficiency in the article, to my mind, is that Captain Roe neglected to include any allowance for the heavy MGs which would almost automatically be attached to a rifle company in a defensive mission.

My experience has been that it is only infrequently that a Marine is caught off base. And I am not an ex-Marine.

CAPT. EDMUND T. NEGRELLI  
Co. K, 169th Infantry  
Middletown, Conn.

### Permission Granted

• May we have your permission to reprint a condensation of "Don't Let 'Management' Trick You" from your September issue, with credit to you and to Colonel Waterman?

There's something paradoxical in this situation. While the article acknowledges that something has been gained by the services through "the influx of successful civilian business leaders into the high policy-making echelons," here am I, coming to ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL to clarify for industrial foremen the point that "management" and "leadership" are one and the same thing!

GEORGE BRENN  
Editor

The Foreman's Digest  
Englewood, N. J.

• We are happy to grant permission to The Foreman's Digest to reprint Colonel Waterman's fine article.

### Slots for Master Sergeants

• We all know that to get promoted to master sergeant is pretty rough, since there are plenty of E-7s on hand and it is a matter of waiting and continuing to do a good job in the meantime. But I think the Army should publish a general order periodically which gives the names of SFCs alphabetically, date of rank, SN, and so on, and number them

promotion-wise. This is what is done for officers. Because master sergeant is the highest grade an EM can reach, I also believe that orders promoting a SFC to MSgt should come directly from DA.

If a SFC is a squad leader and is promoted by DA, he should automatically be transferred to a job that requires a MSgt, even if he has to change station, staying within his MOS if possible. If a captain is promoted to major, he doesn't remain as a company commander, but is given a job with more responsibility.

Everyone talks about prestige for NCOs. This will do it! Warrants should be signed by the Chief of Staff and Secretary of the Army, making the promotion permanent. In fact, all NCO grades should be permanent.

SFC JAMES H. ROBERTSON  
Fort Lewis, Wash.

### Identification for Members

• I have been a member of the Association since March 1955. I would like to know if the Association of the U. S. Army has any automobile stickers or tags, or lapel pins, that can be purchased in order that members can be identified.

KENNETH ROSEN

1650 Mohican St.  
Philadelphia 38, Penna.

• The Association does not have such items for sale at the present time. If there is enough interest among our membership to warrant the manufacture of automobile stickers or tags, or lapel pins, the matter will be considered at a future meeting of our Executive Council.—THE EDITORS.

### Keep the Old Units

• I had thought that this letter would be one of a flood—encouraging and reiterating the stand taken in the May issue on the importance of regiments and the need of carrying on the fine regimental traditions. But so far no reaction.

Perhaps that is because of the new warfare, the atom and all the rest, or the new Army, or the short-term draftees and enlistees. But these are the foremost reasons why we must develop a stronger and more continuing military tradition and history. Our Army has a glorious, but far too little known, tradition and history that all men, new and old alike, should know, appreciate, and join in.

\* \* \*

The old units should stay, and they should make the most of their background. The men, the Army, and the Nation would benefit. Fighting men in fighting units are part of a tradition. They should know of their unit and be proud of it.

LT. P. C. LEFFEL, JR.  
12 East 3d St.  
Corning, N. Y.

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For liason/cargo work it will accommodate 6 passengers or 1000 lbs. of freight for a range of 500 miles.

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POSTAL STATION "L" TORONTO ONTARIO

# THE CHANGING ARMY

GENERAL MAXWELL D. TAYLOR

The Chief of Staff reviews the fire power and mobility aspects of an army passing from the age of gunpowder to the age of atomic power

**A**RMIES, like people, change. A good army changes for the better. The United States Army has come a long way since the unhappy days following the war when, in common with so many other fine divisions, the 101st was inactivated and the military strength of America sadly reduced. Today it is in an era of revolutionary change in which weapons and tactics are changing at a faster rate than at any time in the history of warfare. . . . We are in the process of passing from a gunpowder army to an atomic army, a transition period which will take years but which requires extremely important decisions to be taken now. It is a period in which the Army is required to be ready not only for the great atomic war which we all fear and hope to prevent, but also for possible small aggressions any place about the world. To be ready for large wars and small wars, using atomic weapons or no atomic weapons or perhaps a limited combination of atomic and conventional weapons, poses enormously complicated problems. We must, of course, be ready for large wars, but it is equally important that we be ready for the small ones. . . . Like the forest ranger, the Army must not only keep ready the men and equipment to stop a huge conflagration, but it must also have the means to put out the brush fires when they occur.

This dual requirement for the big war and the small war means that we must constantly develop two fundamental capabilities: fire power and mobility. . . . The rapid development of these same capabilities on a world-wide strategic scale . . . constitutes the major aim of the present Army. The fire power will come from the improved weapons which have been designed, many of which are in the hands of our troops—the Army's atomic cannon, the Honest John rocket, the Corporal missile, and many other similar weapons. The mobility will come from the improvement in all forms of transportation, but particularly in the field of air transport. Neither element—fire power or mobility—is sufficient without the other. . . . Together, in the proper combination, they are the answer to the threat of aggression large and small. . . .

The Army's primary role is to prevent war or to win war. To perform this role, the Army requires tactical and strategic flexibility which will allow us to fight anywhere, any time, using the degree of force appropriate to the situation. The Army is the most flexible form of military power. It is able to tailor the force which it applies to fit the time, place, and enemy. It can apply terrible destruction if necessary; but on the other hand, it can temper its force, and make the retaliation fit the aggression.

While progress in new weapons proceeds apace, it is important that we do not neglect the conventional family

of weapons. . . . We have better self-propelled, recoilless, and automatic weapons and rockets. . . . These improvements have vastly increased our fire power rate. The M1 rifle . . . will, in the not too distant future, be superseded by a new and better rifle. From the grenade to the 280mm cannon, the Army's family of weapons is designed to permit a reduction in manpower in the exposed front line while supporting that line with increased weight of metal. We have developed and will continue to develop along both atomic and conventional lines.

**T**HIS fire power will be valueless to us unless we can move it rapidly to the threatened points in time to resist aggression. Fire power, important as it is, is not enough unless it moves into position from which it can destroy the enemy. . . .

Today, we are convinced that most of our combat organizations, including organic equipment, must be air-transportable, not only for the airborne division but for the infantry division as well. The basic idea, the feasibility of which we demonstrated in World War II, has recently been illustrated in the application of operation GYROSCOPE. . . . During this operation, more than 3,500 troops of the 508th RCT were flown from Louisville, Kentucky, to Ashiya, Japan, and more than 2,700 troops of the 187th RCT from Ashiya to Fort Bragg. . . . If we can air-transport a regiment, we can air-transport a division, provided we plan realistically now. Although the expense of this kind of movement may seem great, strategic air mobility multiplies the effectiveness of our central reserve and reduces the number of troops which must be kept overseas. Thus, it can be, in fact, a great economy.

\* \* \*

**T**OGETHER, the Army and the Air Force must constantly seek to improve transport aircraft. . . . Within five years, we expect new and improved heavy transports to fly with pay loads up to 100,000 pounds.

The problem of development of air-transportability, however, does not call merely for improvements in aircraft. . . . The Army's part in the program must emphasize reductions in the weight and size of our equipment, and the development of better means of getting it to the ground and into action. . . .

In short, the Army today is bent on reaching a condition of airborne effectiveness which we are convinced is necessary for the successful conduct of modern warfare. We want an Army with many completely air-transportable combat units, complete with sufficient weapons, vehicles, and supplies to sustain themselves in ground operations.

Condensed from an address to the tenth reunion of the 101st Airborne Division Association





SPEEDY NEW

TURBOPROP

DROPS 'EM EASY

READY FOR ACTION

## USAF HERCULES

All the missions of the Tactical Air Command have one thing in common: urgency! Whatever the need, TAC must answer it *fast*. That's why *mobility* is so vital.

Suppose the call is for paratroops. USAF's new C-130 Hercules, built by Lockheed, is the ideal paratroop transport. Look how the Hercules provides paratroop mobility:

64 fully equipped paratroops can run aboard four abreast on the rear-door ramp. In minutes the Hercules is loaded.

Up goes the ramp and, with turboprop power, the Hercules is airborne in seconds.

Flying faster than most commercial transports, and with great range, the Hercules gets where the paratroops are needed in a hurry. Inside, each paratrooper has his own seat, 2 feet wide. The cabin is pressurized and air conditioned, minimizing in-flight fatigue.

Two special side doors at the rear of the Hercules were designed for easier troop dropping. An effective wind-stream deflector and a unique floor extension make paratroop drops easier, faster and safer.

USAF's Hercules is now in production at Government Aircraft Plant No. 6 at Marietta, Ga., America's first turboprop production line for transports.

GEORGIA DIVISION

**LOCKHEED**

AIRCRAFT CORPORATION

Marietta, Georgia

# FRONT AND CENTER

## Solution

Secretary of the Army Brucker says that the spirit of "defeatism" that exists among some Army officers has no rational basis and he is going to show them they are wrong. Secretary Brucker is right, and we are behind him one hundred per cent. Indeed, we are so much in accord that we feel completely unabashed in offering him a simple method of achieving this. One is to stop right here and now every contemplated reduction in the size of the Regular Army establishment and then begin to obtain for the Army the authorizations and the funds it needs to make it an atomic-age fighting force.

## Sanforize the Budget

Time was when the Army could enter upon a new fiscal year confident that the full sum in appropriations bills passed by Congress (and signed by the President) could be used to pursue approved plans. But no more. These days, the approved annual appropriation seems to be little more than a ceiling on expenditures. What floor there is is constantly threatened with collapse by the action of officials who are without direct responsibility for national defense. Not only is this a hell of a way to run any kind of institution (public or private), but it places an intolerable burden on those who have the responsibility for both day-

to-day operations as well as future plans and future budgets. Now as they plan and justify future budgets they must constantly rush to shore up the present one. Indeed, if this trend continues, it is evident that the preparation of future budgets should be considered nothing more than an onerous dry run.

*U. S. News & World Report*, a responsible and knowing publication, in reporting on the "shrinking military budget," said that whereas the Administration asked for \$35.7 billion for the military services last January, it got \$35 billion from Congress which it promptly cut to \$34 billion and hopes to reduce to \$33 billion by the end of the fiscal year. One solution for this kind of thing might be the appointment of a federal Director of Sanforization, who would be empowered to see to it that pre-shrunk (before legislative approval) appropriations won't be further shrunk after legal approval. Obviously, the authority of this Director will have to be equal to that of the Director of the Budget and the Secretary of the Treasury.

## Damned If You Do, or Don't

The most serious aspect of the problem of proper conduct by prisoners of war is the tendency of the American people to think of it as a service problem. Actually, as the Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War made abun-

## A BRISK CANTER AROUND THE E RING WITH TWO IMPUDENT INDIANS


TWO experienced denizens of the Pentagon—Lt. Col. Anthony L. Wermuth, the author, and Lt. Col. Robert B. Rigg, the illustrator, have come up with another spoof of the Pentagon in *Portraits*

from *Pentagonia (Or Six Laps Around the Ring)* (Military Service Publishing Co., \$1.00). Here's a fair sample, constituting both a come-on and a warning.

### MESSENGER

MAJESTIC AS THE MAURETANIA,  
Leisurely as the wide Missouri,  
The envy of all peripatetic action officers  
Flows into an intersection  
Atop his cart-cum-bicycle,  
Tinkling its inaudible bell—  
A gentle warning to all traffic  
Abroad  
In the Pentagon fog.  
Knows the location of ASAF (FM),  
OP 69.3,  
G3 PL PP,  
And the carpeted hole-in-the-wall  
In which  
C/R&D, DC of S, P&R  
Does uncanny and herculean work  
In the advancement  
Of something.

The cart is abrim with messages;  
With studies and reports in 17 volumes  
And in 30 copies;  
And with correspondence riding  
An internal merry-go-round,  
Trying to capture the brass ring  
Of still another indorsement.  
If,  
By some un hoped-for mischance,  
The whole cargo  
Were to be jettisoned down the wrong  
chute—  
Preferably the one marked  
"Incinerator"—  
Many an otherwise  
Hard-pressed shop  
Could start tomorrow  
With a clean slate  
And no regrets.



### Another Army Job Competently Performed

As always in time of national disaster, the Army was in the forefront of all agencies engaged in the rescue, relief and rehabilitation of communities destroyed by the East Coast floods that followed in the wake of Hurricane Diane. More than 2,200 soldiers manning helicopters, trucks, generators, signal equipment, mobile bridges and other equipment rushed to the rescue. Army emergency rations, blankets, mattresses, and medical supplies were distributed to flood victims and areas. And as the news of the disaster moved off the front pages, the Army engineers moved into the herculean task of cleaning up and restoring life to stricken communities. And at the same time Army engineers began a long-range study of how to prevent or minimize the loss of life and damage to property by hurricanes.



Children stranded at a summer camp by Hurricane Diane are rescued by an Army helicopter

dantly clear (see page 32), the problem belongs to the American people. The man who breaks in the prison camp does so because someone failed him—his parents, his church, or his school—long before he put on a military uniform. All the training camps can do—no matter how intelligent the instructors or how arduous the training—is give a man some knowledge of what he will face and how to face it, plus perhaps a little stiffening of the backbone in the form of military discipline. But if that backbone wasn't composed of good stuff originally, and fortified with inner resources of the mind and spirit, all that training will be quickly forgotten when the chips are down and the man stands practically naked before his captors. If this is a crisis, it is first a crisis of the home, of the church, and of the school, and finally, a responsibility of the military services to handle as best they can.

The fact that some people profess to be horrified at revelations of the "realistic" training in methods Communists use against prisoners makes the responsibility of the military services doubly difficult. Indeed, it is a case of being damned if you do and damned if you don't. We are thinking of the "damns that you didn't" that will be heard if another Korea comes bursting over the horizon. When under-strength and under-powered American and allied forces are being pushed back toward another Pusan perimeter and the demand is for warm bodies to plug the battle lines, will the requirements of "realistic training" in Communist techniques against prisoners of war take precedence, or will the troops be rushed to the perimeter as they were in 1950? The answer is obvious. Necessity will

rush them to the battle lines. There is an alternative, a very simple one: Maintain trained and ready Army strength capable of handling any such situation. Indeed, the very existence of such a force would likely deter an aggressor from such an adventure, which makes it doubly good sense. Cheapest insurance in the world, too.

### No Happy Ending

The annual convention of the American Psychological Association is usually the signal for military psychologists to make public some of their findings. This year was no exception, and so from San Francisco, where the APA was meeting, came these gems of research:

- A reliable method of predicting which West Point cadets will later receive high leadership ratings was described by three psychologists from the Personnel Research Branch of TAGO. The method involves a self-description by each cadet, and facts about his age, height, weight and physical proficiency.

- A high level of noise disturbs a person's ability to make time judgments, Aero Medical Laboratory psychologists said. They took fourteen men and exposed them to quiet and noisy periods while requiring them to perform a difficult task involving keeping track of various things happening. The psychologists concluded that "time judgments are distorted in a high energy noise field."

- Fifty-four per cent of 3,500 Regular Army officers, ranging from second lieutenant through colonel, told Army researchers that career security was the principal attraction of a military career. Nine per cent considered it one of

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With rustic bridges and lovely paths through the myriad shrubs and flowering plants, this delightful 7-room home, built on the highest point of land in the area, has superb views.

The air-conditioned Mission style house is skillfully planned for today's informal living; a large glass-enclosed patio is an outstanding feature. Only the best of materials and craftsmanship have gone into its construction. Each of the 3 well-appointed bedrooms has a private bath. The furnishings, in charming taste, are included. There are a superintendent's lodge, greenhouse, garages, servants' houses, kennels and stables.

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Jet Powered YH-52

PIONEERING: New Flight Principles  
Advanced Propulsion  
Methods

Watch Hiller pace the industry in  
new developments.



**HILLER HELICOPTERS**  
PALO ALTO, CALIFORNIA

## Front And Center

the greatest deficiencies of the military services. Both those officers who wanted to stay in the Army and those who wanted to resign expressed dissatisfaction with pay, the researchers reported.

¶ The use of short motion pictures (five to 10 minutes in length) that describe typical leadership problems but are without endings, "happy or otherwise," are useful training devices, a Fort Ord Army Human Research unit reported. They said the students would discuss the situation pictured "as if the men were going over a situation which they had seen happen in a real squad in their own companies that very day."

### More from Red Star

A couple of months ago we gave you a report on the content of the Soviet Army newspaper, *Red Star*. Since then we have been favored with more reports on *Red Star* and as we toiled through the dreary stuff a not so very striking truth was revealed to us: armies have a lot in common, no matter what the ideologies of the governments they serve.

What problems do you suppose most bother contributors to *Red Star*? Not the agricultural crisis, nor the traffic jams in Moscow, nor even the problem of juvenile delinquency. Much as we hate to admit it we have learned that contributors to *Red Star* are troubled by some of the same problems as contributors to *THE ARMY JOURNAL*. For example, *Red Star* contributors view with alarm:

The growing trend towards taking authority away from junior officers and noncommissioned officers. There are complaints of over-supervision of junior officers, of not permitting noncoms to praise or punish privates who don't obey them. "Officers must not carry out every detail by themselves, but give noncommissioned leaders the opportunity to act sometimes on their own," one Col. Gen. I. Chistyakov declared in a *Red Star* article.

Then there is lack of realism in training and maneuvers. In an editorial entitled "Improve Leadership of Maneuvers," *Red Star* deplored the collaboration that went on between ma-

neuver "enemies." Such "taking things easy" is also deplored by other writers. There are charges that cheating is widespread on the rifle range, that soldiers who fail to pass the bayonet tests aren't required to repeat the tests until they do pass. One major deplored the fact that his superiors were requiring soldiers to jump only 3 feet 10 inches when regulations prescribe that they jump 4 feet 2 inches. The title of his strictures made clear his intent: "For a High Degree of Physical Training of Warriors in Camp." Another approach to this same subject was made by a writer who complained that some soldiers were so impressed with the various new push-button devices that they decided that physical training was outdated since muscles are not needed in this atomic era. A tank commander discovered that some instructors were permitting tank crews to achieve spectacular results by going through the same problem over and over again and "firing from stationary positions instead of on the move." Another noted that during an infantry maneuver "obstacles existed only on paper for the benefit of staff officers; all actions were planned well in advance so as to avoid any surprises."

The problems that plague Soviet troop information programs are not unlike our own. There appears to be a lack of interest on the part of high commanders; dreary lectures, insufficient preparation, and a lack of real interest on the part of the soldiers. One colonel writing on this subject said it would have to be admitted that in many cases soldiers listen to political lectures just to be polite [!] and that political officers seem less concerned with informing the men than they are in being able to report to the higher authorities that they had held a large number of meetings. *Red Star* is pretty frank at times and in one article it stated that in one command not a single lecture had been delivered in a period of three weeks although the officer in charge had reported in glowing words his propaganda efforts during the period. One officer expressed surprise to learn that some soldiers "read nothing in their

(Continued on page 56)



**SOMETHING**  
*is happening at M.I.T.*

We're happy to know that the same accelerated pace is taking place at every engineering school throughout the land. It means that today's aeronautical developments demand technological skills which have no precedent.

The striking power of a fighter plane depends upon the competency of those who designed it. Republic's engineering resourcefulness created the first U.S. 400 ... 500 ... and 600 mile-an-hour fighters, it gave the war famed Thunderbolts and Thunderjets of war tested worthiness their powerful punch and ruggedness.

Current proof of staff proficiency and projected thinking are demonstrated in the F-84F Thunderstreak ... atomic-bomb-carrying jet-fighter-bomber, and its photo reconnaissance counterpart the RF-84F Thunderflash ... presently flying with units of the USAF and the NATO Air Forces.

We feel confident that whatever the trend of tomorrow's airpower needs may be, alertness to new techniques should add a potent blend when mixed with the skill of those veterans who have established Republic's reputation.

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*Designers and Builders of the Incomparable* **THUNDER-CRAFT**

## THE MONTH'S AUTHORS

RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF ("What's Behind Soviet Disarmament?" page 22), a specialist on Soviet military and political affairs, has been a member of the staff of The Rand Corporation since 1950. He has lectured on various aspects of Soviet military affairs at the National War College, the Army War College, the American Military Institute, and elsewhere. He received his doctorate at Yale. His *Soviet Military Doctrine* (The Free Press, Illinois, 1953), was reviewed in *The Journal* for February 1954.

MAJOR RALPH B. VOTE, JR., MPC ("Command Discipline," page 28), is provost marshal of the 3d Armored Division at Fort Knox. He was a Colorado patrolman for six years before entering the Army as a Reserve officer in 1942. He is a graduate of The Infantry School (1943), and the PMG School (1949), where he later was an instructor. Major Vote has served with the headquarters of four corps and three divisions, in addition to other MP assignments. He wears nine campaign stars for service in World War II and in Korea, and was awarded the Bronze Star for valor and meritorious service.

MASTER SERGEANT GERALD L. CRUMLEY ("The Sergeant Shoulda Stood in Bed," page 31) entered the Army in 1944. He had two peacetime tours in Germany and a year of stalemate infantry service in Korea after what he calls "a ghastly six months" in Japan. After a try at civilian life in 1949 he returned to the Army. He is now an ROTC instructor at Augusta Military Academy, Fort Defiance, Va. He insists a large, black, surly dog *did* bite him on Armed Forces Day.

COLONEL VIRGIL NEY, Infantry-USAR ("Death of an Army," page 38), first broke into print as a second lieutenant with "The CMTIC Instructor," in *Infantry Journal* for May-June 1932. During World War II he served in the Pacific, and in the Philippines was acting historian on General MacArthur's staff. After a hitch in the Office of the Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs, in 1947 he went to China as adviser to the Ministry of National Defense. In Korea he was historian of Eighth Army and later served with KMAC as senior adviser, Psychological Warfare, ROK Army, and as senior adviser in G3 and assistant senior adviser, Korean Army



DR. R. L. GARTHOFF

Training Command. As we go to press, Colonel Ney is on leave, awaiting assignment to duty in the Washington area.

COLONEL HENRY E. KELLY, Infantry ("Chalk Talk for Platoon Leaders," page 43), retired from the Army in June 1954. His service includes combat in both World Wars, as well as two details each as an instructor at The Infantry School and the Command and General Staff College. His last active assignment was as President of CONARC Board No. 3. He is Associate Director of Military Arts with Human Research Unit No. 3 at Fort Benning. His last contribution was "The Army's Fifth Amendment" (September 1955).



DR. ELI GINZBERG


ELI GINZBERG ("The Lieutenant and His Men," page 47) is Professor of Economics at Columbia's Graduate School of Business, specializing in human resources. During World War II he was special assistant to the Chief Statistician of the War Department on manpower and personnel matters, and Director of the Resources Analysis Division, Office of the Surgeon General, in charge of medical logistics. He has served on committees for the Secretary of the Army, including the Medical Advisory Committee and a special review committee on operations research. Dr. Ginzberg also serves as consultant to the Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Personnel and to the Secretary of Labor, and is Director of Research of the National Manpower Council, established at Columbia by President Eisenhower and supported by the Ford Foundation. He is the author of *Psychiatry and Military Manpower Policy*, collaborated on *The Uneducated*, and is currently preparing the manuscript for *Personality and Performance: A Study of the Ineffective Soldier*.

MAJOR CHARLES E. SPRAGINS, Infantry ("CMD: What It Is and What It Does," page 53) is a 1945 graduate of the Military Academy, and completed the Advanced Course at Benning in 1953. He is currently assigned to CMD.

EX-ASSISTANT PMST ("Summer Training, Not Summer Camp," page 50) is the pseudonym of a captain of Infantry who graduated from USMA in 1949. After the usual branch and school assignments he served a tour as Assistant PMST. He is now at Benning for the Advanced Course.

All of the service of COLONEL DAVID P. GIBBS ("Communications Are Not Logistics," page 51), USMA 1933, has been in the Signal Corps. He is a graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College, the National War College, the Air War College, and The Signal School. He is Chief, Communications Branch, J3 Division, FECOM, under orders for The Signal School. His last contribution was "Tomorrow's Communications" (May 1955).

SPECIALIST FIRST CLASS A. LINCOLN BYARS ("I'm a Specialist," page 51) is a regular who, as he says in his *Cerebra-*



## SUPER-MOBILITY

### For the Army!

In the rapidly changing concepts of modern military tactics, mobility still remains an important key. And there is no vehicle but the helicopter that fulfills the requirements of completely unlimited movement and utility.

The United States Army, early to recognize this unique capability of the helicopter, has welded rotary wing aircraft into an integral part of its plans and operations.

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Bell Aircraft Corporation, one of the Army's first rotary wing suppliers, is proud that Bell H-13 helicopters are making continued and significant contributions to the mobility of Army corps and the advancement of Army aviation.

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*"The most famous name in helicopters"*

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Army troops utilizing H-21C during maneuvers.

## 20 TOUGH GUYS IN A HURRY

General Forrest would have loved the Piasecki H-21C helicopter. It "gits thar fustest with the mostest men." Twenty heavily armed infantrymen can be transported from advanced air fields direct to combat areas.

Not only troops, but other material can be hauled by the H-21C workhorse. It's capable of carrying loads over two tons and has been especially designed to perform a wide variety of rugged military and commercial tasks.

The tandem rotor arrangement, with its inherently powerful control system, permits operation under many and varied conditions. Whether used in the tropics or the mountain areas in the North, the H-21C is recognized for its speed, range, lifting power and ease of maintenance.



Artillery pieces, such as this 105mm howitzer, and other heavy equipment can be brought directly to the combat area by air.

This new carrier is just another result of Piasecki Helicopter Corporation's unceasing effort to improve helicopter performance—to build helicopters to do more jobs and do them better than ever before.

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tion, has served from private to first lieutenant. He has been detachment commander, platoon leader, executive officer, and assistant depot commander. He is in the G4 section of Seventh Army headquarters in Germany.

LIEUTENANT BERNARD E. FULLER, Signal Corps ("In Defense of Army Schools," page 52), is a Reserve officer on active duty as Assistant Training Officer in the Officers' Department of The Signal School.

All book reviews this month are by frequent contributors. MAJOR GENERAL H. W. BLAKELEY, Artillery, retired, has contributed many articles and reviews to The JOURNAL and the general mili-

### ASSOCIATION ROTC AWARDS


During the past school year the Association of the United States Army expanded its program of ROTC medal awards to include all Senior Division Army ROTC units regardless of branch affiliation. The Association medal was awarded in 215 ROTC units.

This program will be continued each year in the future. The medal is offered for presentation to the winning cadets in the Advanced Course. While the medal is usually awarded on the basis of all around performance, academic and military, the specific criteria and the actual selection are left to the discretion of the respective professors of military science and tactics in order to facilitate a proper balance of awards in each institution.

The medals for award in the Spring of 1956 will be mailed soon in order that they may be displayed during the school year. All Senior Division ROTC units are eligible to participate. PMS&Ts who desire to obtain the medal are requested to advise us.

tary press, as has BRIGADIER GENERAL DONALD ARMSTRONG, Ordnance Corps, retired. LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAUL M. A. LINEBARGER, MI, USAR, is Professor of Asiatic Politics at the School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, and consultant to the Department of the Army. GERALD TOOKER and COLONEL S. LEGREE are the pseudonyms of artillerymen of long service. MAJOR NORMAN H. WAMPLER, Infantry, enlisted in the Army in 1943, won a wartime commission, and was integrated into the Regular Army in 1949. In Korea he served with the 27th Infantry. He is infantry instructor in the Combined Arms Branch, Department of Military Art of The Engineer School at Fort Belvoir.





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
As a result of this far-reaching program of exploration—which includes the establishment of an independent laboratory for pure and advanced re-

search—exciting new long-range developments have created exceptional opportunities at Martin on projects of the highest priority and importance.

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## ENEMIES' MORTARS LOCATED BY RADAR

Army Used Device Against Reds in Korea, NY TIMES, DEC. 12, 1954

### THE STORY BEHIND THE STORY:

■ "Hundreds of soldiers now returned safely from Korea literally owe their lives to the extreme accuracy and speed of the new counter-mortar system." This good news was revealed by the Signal Corps in December when the public first learned of the existence of the MPQ-10 Mortar Locator, one of the Army's best kept secrets.

■ How could a carefully concealed enemy mortar be located and destroyed

after just one or two shells had been fired? And how could such devastating accuracy be repeated over and over again—no matter how often the enemy relocated his mortars? These were important questions in Korea.

■ Actually, the uncanny efficiency of the MPQ-10 Mortar Locator was due to the joint efforts of the Army Signal Corps and Sperry engineers. Working together, they developed a new portable radar system for use at the front lines. How does it work? An automatic radar tracker detects and "locks on" the path

of enemy mortar shells. In effect, it traces each shell back through its trajectory and reveals the enemy position. This information is then relayed to an artillery fire direction center which directs a return barrage against the enemy mortar in a matter of minutes.

■ Delivering this Mortar Locator to the troops is another example of Sperry engineering and production solving a problem to meet a critical need. Today, in the air, at sea, as well as on land, Sperry is helping extend our nation's capabilities with instruments, controls and systems for all branches of the military as well as for important segments of industry.

**SPERRY** CYROSCOPE COMPANY  
Great Neck, New York

DIVISION OF SPERRY RAND CORPORATION

# THE ARMY TEAM

**. . . Greater than the sum of its parts**

**T**EAMWORK is the U. S. Army's way of doing business. The structure of the Army—two- and three-man weapons crews, squads, sections, platoons, companies, battalions, regiments, groups, brigades, divisions, commands, corps, armies and army groups—testifies to the team concept. The final team is the finest of them all: the entire U.S. Army.

In the service schools, in the training camps, in the ZI and overseas, teams are built and teamwork made more perfect. The arms and services form specialized teams that are merged into the combined-arms teams of the larger units. The vital teamwork between combat and supporting commands is carefully nurtured by higher commanders. Every responsible soldier from the corporal leading a gun crew to a theater commander has the job of making his team a more perfect instrument for the security of the nation.

**T**ECHNICALLY and organizationally then, the U.S. Army is by all odds the most magnificent machine for purposeful action ever conceived by man. It has its frictions, but it also has its moments. It can put on an eye-stopping parade on Michigan Boulevard, it can come to the aid of flood victims in Pennsylvania, it can equip and train foreign armies, it can quell a riot, put out a fire, build a dam, develop a new surgical technique, defend a city from enemy air attack, help send an earth satellite into space, give a troop of Boy Scouts a rousing good time. Its members can and do voluntarily contribute thousands of dollars to the relief and education of defenseless waifs tossed up on the world's battlefields, thus testifying that the U.S. Army has not only mind and muscle but also a heart.

Most important of all, the U.S. Army can fight a small war or a big one because its organization is supple and its celerity tremendous. It is the only self-contained force that can defeat an enemy, move into the enemy's vital areas—and stay there.

**T**HE Army spends so much time doing these things or learning to do them better, that it doesn't know itself as well as it should. Its separate parts concentrate so hard on the job in hand that they seldom have time to understand or appreciate the point of view of other parts. For that reason a splintering tendency sometimes shows itself. It is made manifest by the occasionally encountered belief that a man's speciality is more important than his uniform and that his best interest lies with other similar specialists who wear another uniform or no uniform at all. This the Association of the U. S. Army does not believe. It believes that Army specialists are soldier-specialists, not specialists who happen to be soldiers. It also believes that most specialists believe this too.

To stress the interdependence of all branches and groups of the Army and to emphasize the common goal of every man in Army uniform, the theme of the annual meeting of the Association of the U.S. Army at Fort Benning on the 21st and 22d of this month is "The Army Team." The cooperation and interest every branch of the Army has shown in this meeting convinces the Association that those of you who attend will go away refreshed and inspired, conscious that the whole U.S. Army is indeed far greater than the sum of all its parts.



Even if the Russians reduce their army by 685,000 men they will still have 140 Soviet divisions, plus 80 satellite divisions.

**Don't kid yourself that the Soviets are disarming because they love peace and are genuinely interested in "easing international tensions." To truly understand what's behind recent Soviet disarmament announcements you have to consider Soviet intentions and Soviet capabilities—which reveal that the Russian Bear has no intention of dulling its claws**

**D**OES the Soviet Union really intend to follow through with its announcement that it will demobilize 640,000 men this year? And, if so, is this being done, as Soviet spokesmen proclaim, because they are genuinely committed to disarmament and the easing of international tensions?

It is most likely that the Soviet Union will demobilize from 640,000 to 685,000 men this year. (The larger figure is based on the previously announced Soviet intention to reduce its forces by the number of men withdrawn from Austria: about 44,000.) But any easing of international tensions that may result will be strictly incidental to the real Soviet purpose—which is to put Soviet forces into better balance and improve the power position of the Soviet Union *vis-à-vis* the Free World.

The timing of the announcement is the tipoff that more than propaganda is involved. Had it been strictly a propaganda gesture the Soviet leaders would have waited until after the disarmament talks began at the United Nations late in August. After one-sided pro-





# What's Behind Soviet Disarmament?

**R. L. GARTHOFF**

posals for immediate multilateral reductions made by the Soviet representative had been turned down by the West, the Soviet leaders could have made a dramatic declaration of their intent to reduce their forces by 640,000 in the interests of peace. Such timing would have reaped greater propaganda benefits than were obtained by the method the Soviet used.

There is a great deal more to this shift in Soviet power than a desire for genuine disarmament. To understand its significance we must dig into several aspects of Soviet strengths and weaknesses, intentions and capabilities.

## Soviet Estimate of the Situation

Soviet policy is calculated in terms not unlike a military estimate of the situation. In making such an estimate, from which possible courses of action are drawn, Soviet national power in all its aspects is calculated relative to the strength of the opponent. The two major calculable sources (and indexes) of national power are military and economic strength.

In assessing the strength of Soviet military forces (which we shall return to in a moment), the Soviet leaders see American air and sea power as still ahead, but with rapid Soviet gains closing the gap in the key areas (nuclear weapons, and strategic air offense and defense systems). In comparing Soviet bloc and Western ground forces, the Soviets see a comfortable superiority of several ground divisions to every Western one. In fact, they have a surplus of ground strength in terms of its missions, even assuming that atomic weapons would be used tactically.

In assessing economic strength, the Soviet leaders are confronted with serious relative weakness in virtually all respects. American industrial superiority remains very great. Bulganin only recently admitted a growing manpower shortage in industry. And in agriculture, internal shortages continually approach a crisis despite almost frantic efforts to put "new lands" under the plow. To increase production, members of the Communist Youth and discharged inductees have, since 1953, been recruited with fanfare as "volunteers" to

## The overall purpose of the realignment of Soviet forces is to gain total greater strength

settle in these new lands. But these measures have been insufficient. More men are needed in agriculture and they can be obtained only from the Army.

THIS "estimate" has been grossly oversimplified to highlight one major consideration: a surplus in military strength (in the ground forces, to be specific) is accompanied by a shortage in the economy, especially in agriculture. The course of action which this estimate suggests is precisely the one which has been adopted. *The reduction in the Soviet military force level is a calculated reallocation of manpower resources from an over-strong sector of national power to the understrength economic sector.* The Soviets have virtually admitted this by including in the announcement of the reduction in force the statement that "the effectives to be demobilized from the army and the navy *shall be insured employment* [!] at industrial establishments, in state farms, and in collective farms in their respective places of residence." Thus they are intensifying a practice that was begun in the fall of 1953. During the past two years, soldiers on active duty have on a number of occasions been used to assist in local harvesting. When discharged, entire units of the outgoing age class have been settled together to form quasi-"military reserve" collective farms. A large proportion of the men to be released in the contemplated reduction in force may be settled in this manner.

### Soviet Strength vis-à-vis NATO

There are two other important factors contributing to the decision to reduce the large standing forces, in addition to the pressure of economic need for manpower. One is the relative balance of ground forces between the Soviet bloc and NATO. The other is the appearance of a modified "new look" in Soviet strategic thinking. Let us examine first the relative ground strength of the two blocs.

Perhaps it is useful to go back for a moment to the situation of ten years ago. The Soviet Union, at its peak mobilization in 1945, had some 15 million men under arms, organized in over 500 motley divisions. The United States had more than 12 million men in its armed forces, although there were only 96 ground (including Marine) divisions. The United States demobilized swiftly, until three years later, in 1948, our combined armed forces numbered under 1.4 million men, without a single combat-ready division! The Soviet Union also demobilized, but it did so more gradually, less completely, and as part of a program of modernization. By 1948 the Soviet armed forces had reached the level of its postwar peacetime standing force: approximately 4 million men in the three services, with 175 line ground divisions. These force levels have since remained virtually constant, with a moderate manpower increase in the air force component. Reequipment with

improved weapons has, of course, continued apace in all services.

IN contrast, having demobilized almost completely, the United States was compelled by the Korean war to raise its forces to a new peak of 3,685,000 men in April 1952. In the three years from 1952 to 1955, the United States has demobilized more than the number of men that the Soviets now propose to cut from their own forces. Present plans envisage a still further reduction by the middle of next year, down to a total of 2,850,000.

A balance sheet of present Soviet and American armed strength shows the great Soviet preponderance in ground forces.

	USA	
Army	1,100,000	18 divisions
Air Forces	970,000	20,000 aircraft
Navy	670,000	9,000 aircraft
Marines	200,000	3 divisions
	2,940,000	21 divisions
		29,000 aircraft
	USSR	
Army	2,500,000	175 divisions
Air Forces	800,000	20,000 aircraft
Navy	650,000	3,000 aircraft
Marines	50,000	
	4,000,000	175 divisions
		23,000 aircraft

This table does not tell the whole story. For one thing, the Soviets have an additional 400,000 men in the para-military police security units (border guards, camp guards, and internal security forces) of the MVD. Also, the Soviets have more combat aircraft in operational units than does the United States, especially in tactical aviation. The Soviet Navy, while deficient in capital ships and completely lacking in aircraft carriers, does have about 25 modern cruisers, over 100 destroyers, and over 350 submarines. The submarines in particular are a potential strategic threat to the United States and NATO.

The ratio of ground strength in the key European theater strongly favors the Communists. The Soviet Union and the eastern European satellites presently have 165 divisions (85 Soviet, 80 satellite) in what we call the European theater, plus another 90 Soviet divisions in central Russia and in Asia. NATO has but 46 active divisions, with negligible standing ground reserves in the United States and the nations of the British Commonwealth.

In the Far East, the Chinese Communists, North Koreans, and Viet-minh have over 3 million regulars

## The Soviet "new look" uses air power to supplement army forces rather than replace them

and 2,500 aircraft. The Republic of Korea, Nationalist China, and Viet Nam have approximately 1 million men, and but small numbers of modern jet aircraft. Soviet ground (and air) forces in the Far East exceed the combined United States and Japanese forces by about the same ratio. The over-all balance thus is even more favorable to the Communist bloc in Asia than it is in Europe.

**R**ETURNING to the announced Soviet reduction of forces, the demobilization of 640,000 men has been scheduled for completion by 15 December 1955. It is to be a reduction of "the army and navy" (the air forces being components of these services), but in actual fact, the reduction will probably be almost entirely in the ground forces, with perhaps some cut in the naval shore establishment. If support forces are retained in roughly the same proportion, the cut may approximate 35 infantry and cavalry divisions. Although this appears to be a substantial reduction in force, there will remain 140 Soviet divisions (of which about 65 are "tank" or "mechanized"), plus the 80 satellite divisions. [Following the Soviet lead, several satellites also announced modest reductions. These reductions may affect slightly the total number of satellite divisions, but will not alter the general picture.] And, as the Soviets are doubtless aware, there almost certainly will be no increase in Western ground strength until the proposed 12 divisions from West Germany are raised.

The Soviet bloc, after the announced Soviet and satellite reductions in force have been made, will retain a superiority in ground forces of almost 3 to 1 in Europe, and over 3 to 1 in Asia—even assuming that no reductions are made in present NATO forces and granting the addition of 12 German divisions.

### The Soviet 'New Look'

The most challenging aspects of the recent Soviet move are the strategic context of the decision to reduce the ground forces, and the extent to which it reflects a "new look" philosophy assigning priority to air-nuclear weapons.

During most of the postwar period, particularly from 1947 to 1953, Soviet military doctrine fell into what we may call "the period of Stalinist stagnation." Modern weapons were developed, but doctrine lagged. Considerable emphasis was placed upon studying the Soviet experience of the recent war as the foundation for developing doctrine. This experience was based upon the concept of air (and sea) power in support of the ground forces. Consequently, while the Soviets have consistently devoted attention to building up both strategic air offense and defense systems, these new arms have supplemented, rather than replaced,

the long dominant ground forces with their supporting tactical air force and coastal naval forces.

**T**HE post-Stalin leadership has increasingly shown evidence of greater attention to the strategic implications of nuclear and other new weapons, and clearer awareness of the geostrategic requirements of the present balance of world power. In the spring of 1954, one element in the Soviet leadership, led by Malenkov, raised the prospect of mutual deterrence as the consequence of Soviet and American achievements in building up the potential for mutually devastating thermonuclear strategic air strikes. Malenkov hinted that this state of affairs made war unreasonable, and hence would permit a reduction in the Soviet armed forces. Bulganin and various military leaders took issue with this point of view. Malenkov's basic premise—that war was less likely because it had become too dangerous for all concerned—was further denounced by Molotov and Bulganin at the time Malenkov was compelled to resign, in February 1955. This disagreement was related to broader differences among the factions of the Soviet leadership.

It might appear that Malenkov's successors have adopted his defense (and foreign policy) program. To a certain extent this may be true, just as Stalin adopted much of Trotsky's program after defeating him. But appearances may also be deceptive. True, the massive standing ground forces are being trimmed. But this may reflect a *reallocation of defense effort from the ground forces to the air forces rather than a reduction of military strength*. At the present time, we can only speculate on whether or not military spending will be reduced, but the recent course of Soviet military budget history may be instructive.

### No Indication of Budget Cuts

Military appropriations, both in budgetary allocations and in actual expenditures, reached a maximum in 1952 (113.8 and 108.6 billion rubles, respectively). The 1953 budget not only marked a decline in allocations (to 110.2 billion), but there was an even sharper decline in actual spending in 1953 (to an estimated 102.9 billion). Actual expenditures in 1954 are not yet known, but the budget approved in April 1954 reduced the budgetary allotment for defense to 100.3 billion rubles. Thus it would appear that Malenkov's program included, for whatever objectives, a retrenchment in over-all military effort. Coincident with his deposition, the new budget for 1955 provided for an increase in defense appropriations from 100.3 to 112.1 billion rubles—a return almost to the all time peak of 1952. There has been no indication of a cut in this military spending program to accord with the reduction in ground forces.

The reasons which led the political leaders to re-allocate manpower from the Army to the economic system may or may not have been fully appreciated by the military leaders. Similarly, the military leaders may or may not fully concur in the foreign policy of "easing tensions" ("peaceful co-existence" renamed). It is possible that one reason for Marshal Zhukov's inclusion in the Soviet delegation to the Geneva "meeting at the summit" was to judge for himself (with Khrushchev and Bulganin) whether Western intentions were really such as to make the contemplated reduction in force feasible at this time. I do not mean that the political leaders necessarily felt compelled to obtain the concurrence of the military leadership for this move, although this is possible. But surely the assent of the military was desirable.

It is necessary to note the role of the military in the recent political conflict between Khrushchev and Malenkov. The senior military leaders had, by virtue of the issues involved, been drawn into the political conflict. They strongly opposed Malenkov's defense budget cuts, his initiation of the trend to a shift from heavy to light industries, and his reduction of the state stock-pile reserves. To some degree, Khrushchev's victory over Malenkov was due to the support of the military.

**T**HE evidence is all too scanty to permit us to judge the attitudes of the military leaders toward the new cut in the army. It is likely that at least a part of the military leadership opposed this measure, particularly since the senior military leaders are, for the most part, men whose careers have been made in the ground forces.

The evidence is not sufficient to enable us to discern specific divisions among the military leaders on this question. (It is clear, however, that, in general, Marshal Konev is more closely associated with Khrushchev than are Zhukov and other senior marshals.)

This brief digression into the rapport between the political and military leaders has been necessary to provide the background against which to consider the emergence of a modified "new look" defense philosophy.

There are no indications which would lead us to doubt that *all* the Soviet political and military leaders are, and have been, aware of the great importance of acquiring and maintaining powerful offensive and defensive air forces. Soviet development and procurement of advanced jet medium and heavy bombers, of all-weather jet interceptors—and doubtless of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons—continues to proceed at maximum intensity.

### Weapons and Tactics

The trend in Soviet military doctrine, as we observed earlier, has, at least until the present, been for these new arms to supplement the traditional combined-arms ground-tactical team, rather than to displace it. Malenkov's economic reforms for the first time made clear the crisis into which this doctrinal view was leading. It was becoming too expensive for the Soviet Union to maintain the traditional massive ground and tactical air forces and simultaneously to create the exceedingly costly modern strategic offensive and defensive weapons systems. It is likely that the problem was aggravated by the coincidental emergence of Malenkov's economic

The Soviets will remain strong in armor and artillery, arms to which they give a great deal of attention.





program at the very time when various new weapons may have been entering the procurement phase and demanding increased expenditures. The adoption of a "new look" by the political leaders may have been influenced by the competing demands on resources.

**M**ILITARY thinking in the Soviet Union continues to differ from American doctrine. There is a strong tendency in Soviet military thought against the view that any single weapon or arm—even strategic air-thermonuclear power—can alone win wars. Recently, beginning in 1953 but culminating in the spring of this year, the increased importance of surprise air attack with thermonuclear weapons has been openly recognized. This is an important modification of traditional Soviet military doctrine, but it is by no means a complete revision or revolution in Soviet military thought. Strategic air offensive and defensive forces continue to complement tactical or theater ground and air forces, although the former are now accorded a greater share of the resources allotted to the armed forces.

The primary mission of the Soviet strategic nuclear air power is deterrence, as is the mission of our own SAC. Its second mission is, in time of war, to deal a devastating blow to SAC and the urban-industrial centers of the United States. But if the thermonuclear strategic striking power of the Soviet Union and the United States should cancel each other out—either in mutual reticence to unleash this weapon in a war, or in massive reciprocal blows—the Soviet military leaders intend to have ready strong forces prepared for either conventional limited war or tactical atomic war.

### The Long War

Soviet military thinking continues to assume that any war will be a long, drawn-out affair. Even the writers who note the increased effectiveness of air-atomic power continue to visualize war in this image. American military thinking is criticized by Soviet military writers for "gambling" on a decisive initial air-atomic blow. The Soviets, in contrast, continue to believe that, despite the admittedly very great effect of such weapons, war would still be determined by the basic over-all military, economic, and moral strength of the nation. This is not "sour grapes"; for better or for worse, the Soviets believe in preparing for a long war in which all arms are necessary.

Thus there is a Soviet "new look," but one which continues to differ in certain significant respects from the dominant American conception. In time, it may move closer to the conclusions held in the West, or it may continue to develop along its own path.

The Soviet "new look," while not the cause of the announced Soviet reduction in its ground forces, provided the strategic basis on which this reallocation of manpower to the economy was justified. It presumably also reflects the basis for a reallocation of the defense budgetary appropriations, to the extent that all or part of the funds earmarked for maintenance of that portion

**Soviet military thinkers do not believe that any single arm or weapon can win a war by itself, nor do they believe that a war can be won with a single air-atomic blow. Therefore, they consider strategic and defensive air forces as being complementary to armies and tactical air forces.**

of the ground forces which are to be released may now be available to supplement other military needs. However, such a development would become fully apparent only in next year's budget. It is important to realize that even a cut in next year's budget for the armed forces, which may occur, would *not* reflect a slackening in the Soviet military effort and would not justify a reduction in our own defense appropriations. The Soviet budget of this year did not, like our own, represent a stage in progressive reduction, but, on the contrary, was a swollen one. In coming disarmament talks, the Soviets may propose or accept further reductions in force, but only on a basis which will preserve a substantial advantage to them in military strength. The relinquishing of additional divisions in exchange for a cut in American air power (the U.S. Army can scarcely be reduced further) would, for example, be acceptable to the Soviet Union.

**S**O, in conclusion, we see that the Soviet Union is *not* "disarming" to "ease world tensions." The real objective of the Soviet reduction in ground forces is to increase over-all Soviet strength *vis-à-vis* the Free World. This is being accomplished by reallocating "surplus" military manpower to the understrength economic sector of Soviet national power. This ground strength is surplus for two reasons. For one, the Soviet bloc will still retain a 3-to-1 superiority over the forces of the Free World, both in Europe and in Asia. Moreover, the modified "new look" military philosophy now adopted by the Soviets recognizes the dominant role of strategic thermonuclear air offense and defense, although it embraces a conception under which strong theater ground, air, and sea forces are also considered essential. Ample forces for these missions will remain after the scheduled reduction in ground strength.

*The only real Soviet effort at "disarming" is the attempt to disarm us, both politically and militarily.* This objective will not be realized so long as we recognize the true purposes of such Soviet measures as the reduction in force and act accordingly.



**The good name of the Army would be improved (and the work of the MPs made much easier) if all levels of command shared in the responsibility for the misconduct of the few**

**F**ROM childhood days good behavior is impressed upon us by admonition, razor stop, staying after school, AW 15, or court-martial, and yet we still have disciplinary problems. The military police, because of the nature of their work, are in a position to say that this quotation from *Officer's Call*, Number 2, 1954, is correct: "Good or bad behavior by one soldier tends to be regarded by the segment of the public observing it as more or less typical soldier behavior. . . . The perfect solution is for every member of the Army to share the responsibility for its good name in the opinion of the American people. . . . Objectionable behavior . . . can be kept to an absolute minimum when commanders appreciate the importance of doing so and take the proper steps to transmit this belief to their men."

In handling offenders reported through channels, commanding officers

do not always realize the results that come from failing to administer adequate punishment. Discipline breaks down within the command, and public appreciation of the Army deteriorates.

To illustrate command failure, here is a true story.

**T**HE provost marshal of a famous infantry division had requested the commanding general that line officers of company and field grade be assigned as "courtesy patrols" to assist the military police in curbing the behavior of military personnel. The provost marshal knew that if the line officers had a chance to observe what the military police and the civilian public saw, corrective action at unit level would result. The commanding general gave his approval, and a young lieutenant colonel from a famous regiment was the first field-grade officer assigned. His attitude toward the captain who was

in charge of the MP town patrol was uncooperative. The captain was explaining the procedures to be followed while on patrol when a commotion was heard. The two officers stepped out into the hallway, and saw two military policemen bringing in a drunken soldier who was cursing, yelling, and struggling. The MPs reported that they had stopped at the local bus station while on routine patrol. The station manager had informed them that a soldier had passed out in the latrine. The military police had been able to get him out of the bus station without the public becoming aware of his drunken condition. The soldier denied being drunk, even though he had to use both hands to steady himself on the desk. He further stated it would do no good to send a DR (disciplinary report) to his outfit, because he ran the outfit; he also made some disparag-

A military police desk sergeant at Camp Crawford, Japan, directs his patrols to trouble spots



# COMMAND DISCIPLINE

**LIEUTENANT COLONEL RALPH B. VOTE, JR.**

Symbolic of military law and order as well as Anglo-American unity, a two-man military police patrol enter an off-limits street in Seoul

ing remarks about his commanding officer's stupidity, ability, and the profession of his commander's mother. The desk sergeant ordered him locked up until he was sober. As the two officers turned away, the lieutenant colonel said to the captain: "That soldier belongs to my service company. He has an excellent record in the battalion. If you had sent through a DR on this incident I wouldn't have believed it because of his fine record. I'll take him off your hands when I leave." The soldier apparently was an 0800 to 1700 soldier, and the officer worked the same hours.

To illustrate the second result of improper behavior which affects our national prestige, I will cite an incident in France, during World War II.

**A** French woman ran a small *brasserie* just down the street from the Lion d'Or, the most famous bar in Reims. After Reims was liberated from the Germans, her little *brasserie* became a favorite with our soldiers. The cordial and friendly woman spoke no English. The night before the incident in her little bar, I had heard her lead the singing of the Marseillaise, followed by our soldiers singing our national anthem; however, a soldier who spoke French and in an attempt at humor had told her that a cordial greeting to



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all Yanks was "Hello ----!" (a word that makes a normal male fight). I am told that she was quite proud of her two words of English, and of course in addressing our soldiers her salutation always brought a roar of laughter.

The next night we received a call at the military police station that there was trouble at the little *brasserie*. When we got there we found broken glass all over the floor, the tables overturned, spots on the wall indicating someone had thrown liquid, and in the corner four soldiers cowering behind a table as Madame threw glass after glass at them. She was screaming at the top of her voice, "*Humiliation, humiliation!*" Apparently a few minutes before our call, someone had translated the word she had been using to greet our soldiers. After I had calmed her down, and recovered our soldiers from under the table, she told her story through a French police interpreter. She asked that no American soldiers be allowed in her place, because she had been so humiliated that she was afraid she could never hold her head up again. We did as she asked, and placed her establishment off limits. We as an army and as a nation lost a good friend because of the thoughtless action of one of our soldiers.

**T**HE thoughtless acts of our officers and men all over the world are a direct reflection on the great percentage of officers and men who never become involved in a serious compromising incident. There have been many times that we, as commanders of units, have looked at the proceedings of our junior officers and men, and have said with a chuckle, "Boys will be boys," and have sent our DR back through channels with the indorsement, "Severely reprimanded under the 15th AW." During World War II many moral bars were let down. The theory was that the "boys" were entitled to a little fun; tomorrow they may die. . . . However, our MPs who have had a lot of experience will tell you that our combat veteran—the one who has heard a shot fired in anger—is not the one who gives trouble. The young replacement who is trying to impress his combat friends with his toughness and virility is the one who shows up in our military police stations.

The procedures established by our commanders in the handling of disciplinary reports are sound. Briefly outlined, they are as follows: Two military police observe a soldier in a viola-

tion which is so serious it must be reported to the unit commander. The report made out by the military police is checked for accuracy and sufficient facts by the desk sergeant, the officer in charge of the town patrol, the sergeant major of the provost marshal's office, and sometimes by the provost marshal himself. The report is then sent to the adjutant for signature and descends through command channels to the man's unit. In some cases, a reply-by-indorsement action is required. This violation and a summary of other serious incidents is placed on the commanding general's desk each morning so that he is informed daily of disciplinary trends and actions of the soldiers of his command.

Up to this point every procedure outlined would appear to be foolproof, but in some cases there is neither adequate, nor any, punishment given. The reasons are that the subordinate commanders delegate these reports to their SIs, who are extremely busy officers, and a further delegation is made to a clerk-stenographer who types in a favorite indorsement, "For your information and action," and it finally ends up with the company commander. From reading the last indorsement, he feels he should take some action, but regardless of what action he takes, this report pertains only to his unit; the rest of the Army is not concerned. He does not fully realize that the action of his soldier was a reflection not only on his unit, but on his commanders and on the U.S. Army, and, in some instances in overseas theaters, on the honor and integrity of the nation. So he indorses back to his parent unit the punishment given, which many times is "Severely reprimanded under AW 15," or "Restriction," or "Investigation indicates no action needed," and the matter is dropped.

**T**HERE have been instances in the past where untrained, immature military police made mistakes. When these mistakes occur and the unit commander has knowledge of them, this most certainly conditions his thinking when he receives a disciplinary report. But as the years roll by, the Military Police Corps, through proper training and selection, are eliminating mistakes, and the present-day unit commander can rest assured that when he receives a disciplinary report, proper disciplinary action should be taken.

MPs do not send up reports on all soldiers who have misbehaved. To il-

lustrate why, our present Provost Marshal General, Major General William H. Maglin, tells the following story of an incident that happened when he was provost marshal of Hawaii, many years ago. The Navy and the Army had a joint shore and military police patrol in Honolulu. One night they received a call from a roller-rink owner that there was a gang fight going on at the establishment between sailors and soldiers. When the paddy wagon returned to the Navy and Army military police headquarters, it was found that the participants in the fight were evenly divided between the two services. The soldiers lined up in front of the Army desk sergeant and the sailors in front of a chief petty officer. The first soldier was asked his name, rank, and unit. He replied, "Doe, John, Seaman First Class, USS ----" —a famous battleship then docked at Pearl Harbor. The desk sergeant, an old-timer in the service, said, "All right, son, let's try it once more: name, rank, and unit," and the soldier replied with the same answer. About this time the Navy chief called over to the Army desk that something was wrong. That this blank-blank sailor claimed to be a member of a famous infantry regiment then garrisoned at Schofield Barracks. The apparent mix-up was caused by a group of soldiers and sailors contending as to which service the local girls showed the most affection for. As the argument grew louder, someone came up with the brilliant idea of changing uniforms, thereby eliminating all personalities and allowing the uniforms to stand on merit alone. The change was made, and the entire group, for testing purposes, went to the local roller rink. How the fight started, and which service uniform was winning were never determined. The proprietor of the roller rink wanted no action taken in so far as he was concerned. There was no damage, and the so-called gang fight on roller skates had been a humorous exhibition to the few spectators. How was this incident handled? The men exchanged uniforms, and after a few sage remarks by the Army sergeant and the Navy chief, the men were sent back to their units. No official action, because none was needed.

There are many incidents that are handled this way. But the simplest short cut to curb *misconduct* is for every member of the Army to share the responsibility for its good name in the opinion of the American people. It's just as simple as that.



# The Sergeant Shoulda Stood in Bed

There are days when you can't lay up a bit of time in this man's Army

## Master Sergeant Gerald Crumley

It was going to be a hot day for the parade, so just before leaving the house I haggled the wife out of a couple of bucks for beer, explaining that no self-respecting master sergeant would allow Armed Forces Day to pass without nuzzling the foam on a few cold ones with his comrades.

By good pre-planning, I managed to get to Tony's in time for an early one before the parade organized. A large black dog bit me on the leg just before I got to the door. I whirled to offer him the other leg, boot first, but spying two kids eyeing me from the curb I withheld my counterattack, thinking that, after all, a considerate master sergeant does not go around kicking dogs. Especially on Armed Forces Day.

Inside Tony's I got a bottle of the favorite and borrowed a clean rag to wipe the hound slobber off my TWs. Tony raised his eyebrows, saying, "Dog bitcha, huh? Wotsa matter, didn't you tell him it was Armed Forces Day?" Laughing uproariously he slapped me on the back, some stray hamburger coming off his hand and sticking to my shirt. The other guys, the early-Saturday-morning boys, joined in with Tony and we all had a good laugh at the military. When the chuckles died down, one of them asked me, "How long you been in, Sarge?"

"Little over eleven," I replied. Up to then this had sounded like a reasonable enough length of time. Of course, not Old Line, but at least I wasn't fresh from basic.

Ed the plumber shook his head. "Hell, if I hadda stayed in I'd have--lessee--over sixteen years by now," he countered.

Tony looked respectfully at Ed. "That right? Boy, you'd just have four years to do! How long were you in?"

Ed took a swig of brew and said matter-of-factly, "Sixteen months. Woulda got out sooner but my records got lost when I went AWOL."

Charlie the retired gravestone setter had been doing some figuring on a paper sack, and spoke up. "Well, boys, I figger if I had stayed in I would have retired long ago. Be sitting pretty, I would."

Tony and the boys made approving remarks, and to be polite I asked him when he was in service.

"Nineteen eighteen," he said. "From July until after the Armistice. Would have had to stay in longer but they set up a discharge center right in my camp and I was one of the first ones out."

THROUGH the screen door I saw Sam the neighborhood postman stooping to scratch behind the black dog's ear. Then he came in, unlimbered his mail sack, and Tony handed him the usual Coke. Sam took out a large hand-

kerchief and wiped his perspiring face. "Boy, is it hot! Only thing that keeps me going is the thought of just two more years, then I hit the old rocking chair." He swigged his pop and sighed. "Yessir, just two more years." Noticing my uniform he said, "How long you been in service, sonny?"

"Oh, not so long," I hedged. "Just sort of getting started."

"You a career man?" he asked.

"Well, I don't know," I mumbled. "Sort of early to start thinking of that."

Killing his Coke he slung his mail bag and started for the door. "Well, don't do like I did. If I had stayed in I could have retired last year instead of toting this fool sack for two more." He moved through the door, patted the black dog, and disappeared up the street.

LEFT by the back door to avoid feeding the dog and met the Major at the parade starting point. He was answering questions coming from all sides, from members of the parade units. One guy in particular was barraging him with complaints. "Major," he was saying, "I been with the fire department for twenty-two years and I never been asked to drive my truck behind Girl Scouts before in one of these parades." He shifted his left arm to offer a better view of the longevity stars on the sleeve. "Another thing, Major. In all my twenty-two years of service I never seen one of these parades start on time."

The Major turned a harassed glance toward me and said, "Well, we'll try to work something out before starting time." He nudged me by the elbow toward the curb. "Listen, Sergeant. Go down to New Street and see if you can switch those Girl Scouts up to the front of the unit." He started making notes on his parade plan and turned suddenly to me. "You know, Sergeant, I envy you. It's days like these that I sort of wish I had stayed an enlisted man. . . . I'd have eighteen years toward retirement now."

NODDED sympathetically and moved down the street.

On the next corner, Sergeant Laret was leaning against a brick wall, scribbling briskly on his parade plan. He looked up as I approached and smiled. "Sarge," he said, "I been figgerin'. When I reenlist in November I'm gonna draw over fifteen hundred bucks in final pay. Gonna sock it in soldier's deposits and let it rest until I finish my twenty in sixty-one." He looked intently at me for a moment, then said, "Whatsa matter, pal? You look beat."

Now it was my turn to look off into the distance. "I dunno, Sarge," I said. "It's just that some days I feel like a dumb recruit."

# WHAT HAPPENED IN THE POW CAMPS



**O**UR cause was simple and just, but our objectives in the Korean War were frequently confused in the public mind.

The Korean War had three aspects. There was the Civil War aspect—North Koreans fighting South Koreans for control of a divided country. There was the collective aspect—the first United Nations' attempt to stop a treaty-breaking aggressor. And there was the Cold War aspect—the Western powers blocking the expansion of Communist imperialism.

The causes of the war, United Nations' objectives and the need for American intervention were not clearly delineated in the public mind. This lack of understanding prevailed among citizens and American fighting men.

The Communists attempted to exploit to the fullest this condition in both international propaganda and in dealing with our prisoners of war.

\* \* \*

During the Korean War 7,190 Americans were captured by the enemy. Of these, 6,656 were Army troops; 263 were Air Force men; 231 were Marines; 40 were Navy men. The Army bore the heaviest burden of prisoner losses. The captives were marched off to various prison camps in the North Korean interior. Altogether there were 20 of these camps.

## "Death Marches"

The first ordeal the prisoner had to suffer—and often the worst—was the march to one of these camps. The North Koreans frequently tied a prisoner's hands behind his back or bound his arms with wire. Wounded prisoners were jammed into trucks that jolted, dripping blood, along broken roads. Many of the wounded received no medical attention until they reached the camp. Some were not attended to until days thereafter.

The marching prisoners were liable to be beaten or kicked to their feet if they fell. A number of the North Korean officers were bullwhip barbarians, products of a

semi-primitive environment. Probably they had never heard of the Geneva Conventions or any other code of war. The worst of this breed were responsible for the murder of men who staggered out of line or collapsed at roadside. They were particularly brutal to South Korean captives. . . . Some Americans, with hands tied behind back, were shot by the enemy.

So the journeys to the prison camps were "death marches." . . . On one of these marches, 700 men were headed north. Before the camp was reached, 500 men had perished.

## Facilities, Food, and Care Were Poor

The camps were what might be expected in a remote corner of Asia. Prisoner rations were scanty—a basic diet of rice occasionally leavened with some foul kind of soup. The Red Chinese and Korean authorities pointed out that this larder conformed with the rules of the Geneva Conventions—the prisoner received the same food as the soldiery holding him captive. Of course, the Chinese were inured to a rice diet. The average American could not stomach such fare. Sickness broke out in the camps. Many of the men suffered long sieges of dysentery.

The men suffered much from cold in winter and heat in summer. Water was often scarce; bathing became difficult. Barracks were foul and unsanitary.

In the best of the camps the men behind the barbed wire were sometimes given tobacco, a few morsels of candy, occasional mail. As will be noted, such items were usually offered as rewards for "cooperative conduct."

A few Red Cross packages got through. However, the enemy consistently refused to permit the International Red Cross to inspect prisoner-of-war camps. There was good reason.

## Camps Varied from Bad to Worse

In the worst of the camps, the prisoners existed by the skin of their teeth and raw courage. Men in the "bad"

camps were known to lose 50 pounds weight in a matter of weeks.

The "bad" camps included the so-called "Bean Camp" near Suan, a camp known as "Death Valley" near Pukchin, another camp called "The Valley," apparently in the vicinity of Kanggye. Among the worst camps were the "Interrogation Center" near Pukchin and a neighboring disciplinary center called "The Caves." This last was literally composed of caverns in which the men were confined. Here they were forced to sleep without blankets. Their food was thrown at them. There were no latrine facilities. In "The Caves" the prisoners were reduced to a degree of misery and degradation almost unbelievable. Those sent to "The Caves" were prisoners accused of insubordination, breaking camp rules, attempting to escape, or committing some other crime (so-called). The testimony of survivors suggests that the "crime" was seldom fitted by the punishment. Some men who refused to talk to military interrogators were threatened with, or sent to "The Caves."

### "Pak's" Was No Palace

Possibly the worst camp endured by American POWs in Korea was the one known as "Pak's Palace." This was

a highly specialized interrogation center located near the city of Pyongyang. The place was a brickyard flanked by Korean houses. It was a North Korean establishment dominated by a chief interrogator, Colonel Pak. Pak was ably assisted by a henchman who came to be called "Dirty Pictures" Wong by the POWs.

The camp was under the administration of a Colonel Lee, and there were several other interrogators on the team. But Pak and Wong were symbolic of the institution. Pak was a sadist, an animal who should have been in a cage. The team employed the usual questionnaires, the carrot-and-prod techniques to induce answers. Failing to induce them, they contrived to compel them. The "Palace" wanted military information. Coercion was used as the ultimate resort. And for Pak, coercion began soon after a prisoner refused to talk. Then Pak would use violence. Abusive language would be followed by threats, kicks, cigarette burns, and promises of further torture.

Several U. S. Army and Navy officers were questioned at "Pak's Palace." A few Army enlisted men went through this brickyard mill. The great majority of POWs held there were Air Force officers. They took a bad beating from Colonel Pak.

## THE PRESIDENT'S EXECUTIVE ORDER

### FOR MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES

**B**y virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, and as Commander in Chief of the armed forces of the United States, I hereby prescribe the Code of Conduct for members of the Armed Forces of the United States which is attached to this order and hereby made a part thereof.

Every member of the armed forces of the United States is expected to measure up to the standards embodied in this Code of Conduct while he is in combat or in captivity. To ensure achievement of these standards, each member of the armed forces liable to capture

shall be provided with specific training and instructions designed to better equip him to counter and withstand all enemy efforts against him, and shall be fully instructed as to the behavior and obligations expected of him during combat or captivity.

The Secretary of Defense (and the Secretary of the Treasury with respect to the Coast Guard except when it is serving as part of the Navy) shall take such action as is deemed necessary to implement this order and to disseminate and make the said code known to all members of the armed forces of the United States.

## CODE OF CONDUCT

1. I am an American fighting man. I serve in the forces which guard my country and our way of life. I am prepared to give my life in their defense.

2. I will never surrender of my own free will. If in command I will never surrender my men while they still have the means to resist.

3. If I am captured I will continue to resist by all means available. I will make every effort to escape and aid others to escape. I will never accept parole nor special favors from the enemy.

4. If I become a prisoner of war, I will keep faith with my fellow prisoners. I will give no information nor take part in any action which

might be harmful to my comrades. If I am senior, I will take command. If not, I will obey the lawful orders of those appointed over me and will back them up in every way.

5. When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I am bound only to give name, rank, service number and date of birth. I will evade answering further questions to the utmost of my ability. I will make no oral or written statements disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their cause.

6. I will never forget that I am an American fighting man, responsible for my actions, and dedicated to the principles which made my country free. I will trust in my God and the United States of America.



**B**UT the prisoners found ways to get around the beating. One way was to convince the captors that you were dumb, stupid, the low man in your class. Undergoing interrogation, one officer convinced his inquisitors that he was the stupidest officer in the service. He was awarded a contemptuous slap, and that was about all.

To the surprise of some prisoners at the "Palace," the interrogation team would sometimes open up with a wild political harangue. Then came the word that the enemy had established a system of indoctrination courses. The prisoner might start the hard way—and be punished by restricted rations and other privations. If he began to show the "proper spirit"—to cooperate with his captors—he was lectured and handed Communist literature. A docile prisoner who read the literature and listened politely to the lectures, was graduated to a better class. Finally he might be sent to "Peaceful Valley." In this lenient camp the food was relatively good. Prisoners might even have tobacco. And here they were given all sorts of Marxian propaganda. The graduates from "Peaceful Valley" and others who accepted Communist schooling were called "Progressives." Prisoners who refused to go along with the program often remained in tougher circumstances. They were considered "Reactionaries."

But the enemy followed no rigid system. Rather, his treatment of prisoners was capricious. Sometimes he showed contempt for the man who readily submitted to bullying. The prisoner who stood up to the bluster, threats and blows of an interrogator might be dismissed with a shrug and sent to quarters as mild as any—if any prison barracks in North Korea could be described as mild.

All in all, the docile prisoner did not gain much by his docility—and sometimes he gained nothing. The prisoner who defied Pak and his breed might take a beating, but again he might not. The ordeal was never easy. But things weren't easy either for the combat troops battling out there in the trenches.

### Progressives and Reactionaries

The POW "political" schools in North Korea were, of course, patterned after the Soviet Russian design. They were part of a mass program to spread Marxian ideology and gain converts for International Communism. The Progressives were called upon to deliver lectures, write pamphlets, and make propaganda broadcasts. Progressive leaders were sent among Reactionary groups to harangue the men. They wrote speeches condemning Capitalism and "American aggression in Korea." They organized a group known as "Peace Fighters."

Fortunately, only a few officers were Progressives. However, their influence was unfortunately strong on the enlisted men. If the Captain can do it, why can't I? If the Colonel signs a peace petition and orders the rest of us to do it, we have to follow orders, don't we? Altogether the enlisted men were on a spot. That many of them refused to join the Progressives (and rejected a promise, sometimes unfulfilled, of better food, minor luxuries, and mail call) says something for the spirit of privates and noncoms. The men who gave the Progressives an argument—the active Reactionaries—were a rugged group.

**B**REAKDOWN of leadership was exactly what the enemy desired. Officers were usually segregated. Then as soon

as a natural leader stepped forward in a camp, he was removed. Progressives were usually placed in leadership positions. And if they weren't obeyed by the other POWs, punishments were in store for the "insubordinate prisoners."

By design, and because some officers refused to assume leadership responsibility, organization in some of the POW camps deteriorated to an every-man-for-himself situation. Some of the camps became indescribably filthy. The men scuffled for their food. Hoarders grabbed all the tobacco. Morale decayed to the vanishing point. Each man mistrusted the next. Bullies persecuted the weak and sick. Filth bred disease and contagion swept the camp. So men died for lack of leadership and discipline.

### Ordeal by Indoctrination

When plunged into a Communist indoctrination mill, the average American POW was under a serious handicap. Enemy political officers forced him to read Marxian literature. He was compelled to participate in debates. He had to tell what he knew about American politics and American history. And many times the Chinese or Korean instructors knew more about these subjects than he did. This brainstorming caught many American prisoners off guard. To most of them it came as a complete surprise and they were unprepared. Lectures—study groups—discussion groups—a blizzard of propaganda and hurricanes of violent oratory were all a part of the enemy technique.

A large number of American POWs did not know what the Communist program was all about. Some were confused by it. Self-seekers accepted it as an easy out. A few may have believed the business. They signed peace petitions and peddled Communist literature. It was not an inspiring spectacle. It set loyal groups against cooperative groups and broke up camp organization and discipline. It made fools of some men and tools of others. And it provided the enemy with stooges for propaganda shows.

Ignorance lay behind much of this trouble. A great many servicemen were 'teen-agers. At home they had thought of politics as dry editorials or uninteresting speeches, dull as ditchwater. They were unprepared to give the commissars an argument.

Some of the POWs—among them men who became defectors—had heard of Communism only as a name. Many had never before heard of Karl Marx. And here was Communism held up as the salvation of the world and Marx as mankind's benefactor.

The Committee heard evidence which revealed that many of the POWs knew too little about the United States and its ideals and traditions. So the Chinese indoctrinators had the advantage.

**T**HE uninformed POWs were up against it. They couldn't answer arguments in favor of Communism with arguments in favor of Americanism, because they knew very little about their America. The Committee heard a number of ex-POWs who stated that a knowledge of Communism would have enabled them to expose its fallacies to their camp-mates. The Red indoctrinators tried hard to win the support of factory workers. But as one of them put it, "We'd heard all that guff before. Back home. We knew their line." Knowledge was a defense weapon.

While it might be argued that few of the men became sincere converts to Communism—indeed, the percentage



seems to have been infinitesimal—the inability of many to speak up for Democracy distressed loyal POWs. Active collaborators aside, there were other passive prisoners who “went along.” They lacked sufficient patriotism because of their limited knowledge of American Democracy.

It seemed that these POWs in question had lost their battle before they entered the Service. Good citizens—loyal Americans—the responsibility for their building lies with the home, the school, the church, the community. When men enter the armed forces, the military services must carry on with this development.

*The committee, stressing the need for spiritual and educational bulwarks against enemy political indoctrination, recommends that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Personnel) be directed to initiate exploratory conferences with the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and other agencies and institutions on pre-service training.*

### **Brainwashing and Indoctrination**

The committee made a thorough investigation of the “brainwashing” question. In some cases this time-consuming and coercive technique was used to obtain confessions. In these cases American prisoners of war were subjected to mental and physical torture, psychiatric pressures or “Pavlov Dogs” treatment.

Most of the prisoners, however, were not subjected to brainwashing, but were given a high-powered indoctrination for propaganda purposes.

In either case the members of our Armed Forces should be given the best education and training possible in the future so that they can resist and cope with these practices.

The Committee also learned that POWs in Korea were not drugged. Other methods such as denial of food or sleep were equally effective and more practical.

### **Behind the Barbed-Wire Curtain**

Perhaps the Red enemy worked harder on the Americans than he did on the other prisoners. An American who signed a propaganda leaflet, a peace petition, or a germ warfare confession, was a big feather in the enemy's hat. Many Americans in Communist POW camps signed something or wrote something. Out of 78 men under various forms of duress, 38 signed germ-warfare confessions. Forty others did not. Both groups were under coercion. Why did some men break, and some refuse to bend?

Many servicemen exhibited pride in themselves and their units. This was particularly pronounced where they had belonged to the same unit for years. They stood by one another like that “band of brothers” inspired by Nelson. If a soldier were sick, his fellow soldiers took care of him. They washed his clothes, bathed him, and pulled him through. They exhibited true fraternal spirit, comradeship, military pride. These soldiers did not let each other down. Nor could the Korean Reds win much cooperation from them.

Interrogation went hand in glove with indoctrination. A prisoner was questioned for military information. He was also queried on his home life and educational background. The interrogator made him put it in writing—a biographical sketch. Seldom did the brief autobiography prove sufficient. The prisoner was usually compelled to

write more, and in greater detail. If his literary efforts were painful, the discomfort was only a beginning. His autobiography was used against him. The slightest discrepancy, and he was accused of lying. He might discover that he had written a confession of some kind. And in any case, the information supplied the interrogators with a useful leverage for more pressure. The author's mistake was in taking pen in hand.

**O**NLY a handful of the POWs in Korea were able to maintain absolute silence under military interrogation. Nearly all of the American prisoners went beyond the “absolute” name, rank, number, date-of-birth restriction.

Reviewing the interrogation matter, the Defense Advisory Committee felt that the steps taken up to now by the Armed Forces had been decidedly inadequate.

*The Committee recommends that the Department of Defense devise a special training program to teach American servicemen the ways and means of resisting enemy interrogators.*

### **What Can Be Done?**

In a war for the minds of men, the enemy's methods can be successfully combatted by military training and civilian education. In battle and in captivity the fighting American is no better than his training and education. Military schooling can teach him combat skills. Such know-how is a “must.”

*The Committee recommends that the Military Services initiate a coordinated training program including—*

*First, general training. This is motivational and informational training to be conducted throughout the career of all servicemen during active and reserve duty. Second, specific training. This is designed for and applied to combat-ready troops. A code of conduct must apply uniformly to all Services, and training must be uniform among the Services to the greatest degree practicable.*

*In all Services training should be adapted to cover the needs of all ranks from the enlisted man to the commander. It must be realistic as well as idealistic. Above all, it must be presented with understanding, skill and devotion sufficient to implant a conviction in the heart, conscience, and mind of the serviceman that full and loyal support of the code is to the best interests of his country, his comrades, and himself.*

**B**UT skill must be reinforced by will—by moral character and by basic beliefs instilled in home and classroom long before a lad enters the military service. Pride in a country and respect for its principles—a sense of honor—a sense of responsibility—such basics should be established long before “basic training,” and further developed after he enters the armed forces.

*The Committee recommends that the services find an effective means of coordinating with civilian educational institutions, churches and other patriotic organizations to provide better understanding of American ideals.*

War has been defined as “a contest of wills.” A trained hand holds the weapon. But the will, the character, the spirit of the individual—these control the hand. More than ever, in the war for the minds of men, moral character, will, spirit are important.

As a serviceman thinketh so is he.

# THE MONTH'S READING

## The Pipeline Must Go

COLONEL THOMAS F. DONAHUE  
"Logistics of the Future"  
*Military Review*, September 1955

As the Army of the future changes in composition to meet the challenge of atomic warfare, so must logistics change. We read of pocket-size divisions, of small self-contained units equipped with all the newer atomic weapons, of cavalry of the sky for use in vertical envelopment, and of supply and evacuation by helicopter. Emphasis is on speed. Service troop strength will be reduced. These are all manifestations of the new look, the "lean and mean" philosophy.

Why has logistics not been included in this new look? Logistics needs revitalizing to fit into the new picture. Can we support this expanded effort with our corpulent pipeline, our vulnerable stockpiles, our meaningless 30 or 60 days of supply—which contains little we need—and 90 years of those items for which we have no need?

A lead editorial in the August 1954 ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL pleads for combat armies to reduce their capacity for consumption. It cites the good army, light in armor but skilled in moving rapidly, as something to think about for the future. Reduction in consumption is only part of the solution. Partisan warfare offers an object lesson to a nation which has gone so far in the opposite direction.

The pipeline as we know it must go. The stockpile must remain in piles of strategic material in the stable form, the oxide of the critical metal. These rightfully belong ahead of the factory, not between the factory and the line of departure.

Supply to the Army in the future requires minimum levels at the gun site with a constant flow from the well back in the United States. The volume must be consistent with frequent moves in either direction. It must be within the capability of available helicopters for rapid displacement on vertical envelopments.

Since rapid movement is envisioned and long supply lines inevitable, the initial resting place must be as close to the line of departure as possible. Replenishment must be by diversion of the outlet nozzle, not through vast stockpiling operations. Remember the soldiers of World War I, forgotten after being detailed to guard the ration pile, who sent word to the unit commanding officer: "We have et up the supplies. What do we do now?"

## RHIP

GENERAL LAURENCE S. KUTER  
*Airman at Yalta*  
Duell, Sloan and Pearce, and Little, Brown & Company, 1955

The January 30 formal meeting of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff in Malta started out in a light vein. The British administrative arrangements for the confer-

ence had been excellent. In one respect, indeed, they appeared to have been a bit overzealous. A British message center had received in the early hours of the morning a stack of envelopes addressed separately to the members of the United States party. Written boldly across the corner of each envelope were the words, "Very Urgent," and these envelopes had been delivered individually as quickly as possible. Some of the recipients were located at breakfast, others preparing for breakfast; some while shaving, and some during the least convenient periods while waking or dressing. General Marshall clearly established his position as the outstanding VIP of the United States party by revealing that he had been awakened by a British Army Sergeant at four o'clock that morning and handed his envelope. The envelope contained an engraved card reading: *His Excellency The Governor and Lady Schreiber request the pleasure of the company of General Marshall at dinner on Wednesday, the 31st of January 1945, at 8 P.M. The Palace. An answer is requested to the aide-de-camp in waiting.*

## Are You a Follower?

LT. COMMANDER CHARLES C. GIBSON, USNR  
"Leadership is Not Enough"  
United States Naval Institute Proceedings  
August 1955

The art of the follower is a difficult art. It is as demanding in its various forms as is the art of leadership. But unlike Topsy, followers don't "just grow." The ability to follow is a refinement of character. This refinement is the result of a channeling and motivation which clearly demonstrate to the individual that what or whom he follows justifies the effort. Basic to this is the will to succeed. A man either wants to do what he can to keep the ball bouncing or he doesn't. It's a simple and straightforward requirement. The follower has to be imbued with this desire. His early training should work in that direction. His whole career should reflect it.

There are some who will say that such a philosophy leads only to utter and numb subordination. They miss the point. We all aim to excel, but we must walk before we can run. Navy-wise we take our first steps as followers. We occupy a definite place in the network of operation. If we can't fill the bill at that stage—and in each succeeding stage—how can we hope to be responsible leaders when our day comes? This is truly the highest individualism: to see ourselves and our duty so clearly that we can place one before the other and do well the job we're assigned to do. An automaton can't do it; nor can an utter and numb subordinate. . . .

The Navy asks no more than it pays for. It rewards in full measure those who meet its exacting standards. The catch is that the reward seems somehow insignificant to those who don't know the standards and have not met them. The yardstick they use is wrong. They don't measure in terms of duty well done, traditions made, or pro-

motions earned. Applied, instead, is a yardstick they wouldn't dream of using in a civilian enterprise. They ask before they give. They grapple with shadows.

The question today is what has become of the spirit of service which so distinguished the Navy of yesterday? Why is it that now, in a period of higher pay and greater concern for the individual sailor than ever before, we do not find more apparent satisfaction with a naval career? Some answer in terms of family separation, better pay outside, loss of military prestige, and similar considerations. These points cannot be minimized, but they don't explain everything by a long shot. Underneath it all, what do the officers and men of the Navy expect? What have they been shown is reasonable to expect? And what do they understand is expected of them in return? Finally, do they seriously plan to get more out than they put in?

The only ones who can answer such questions are the individuals themselves. There's nothing wrong with criticizing the Navy, if criticize it one must, but it should be on rational terms—along with a good, fighting effort to do a job before tossing in the sponge. Grippers are a dime a dozen. We can use some followers.

Let's look at some facts. If we're not satisfied with the Navy, we're not satisfied with our own performance in it, somehow. I don't mean smugness and complacency. Far from it! But the consciousness of a job well done is an important part of a man's adjustment to his position; and it's pointless to excoriate the position without looking at the incumbent. The Navy does not change by some magic process. It's you, and me, and the admirals and the recruits who improve or not, because we're the Navy. Boiled down to its bare essentials it requires that we do our jobs—our individual jobs—as thoroughly and as willingly as we know how. In short, *we need to develop a spirit of good followership*. It's our responsibility, and by so doing we shape the Navy and our careers into something to be proud of.

Consider the question of career in its relation to good followership. The reservist has no naval career in the usual sense. Regardless of his personal desire there will come that day of separation from active duty. He is, therefore, impermanent in a very real sense as part of the active duty picture. Impermanent also are those others who clearly plan to spend the minimum possible time as regulars. But need it be the case that they cannot become good leaders or good followers, simply because of their impermanence? I don't think so. *A man has a full-time career as a human being*. If he reneges in one part of that career, it's going to poison the rest. The temporary nature of a person's service cannot be a reason for his offering less or the Navy's expecting less in whatever billet he fills. Why should it be, if he will supply the energy and initiative—the good followership—needed to learn his job?

Until all of us—reserve and regular alike—know our jobs, ourselves, and our leaders; until we are willing to be inspired and to give loyalty upward and downward; until we exercise a constructive initiative; until we learn a reasoned partiality; until we can willingly accept delegated authority and the decisions of our superiors; and until we can readily subordinate our personal welfare to that of the service, we are not followers and the Navy is the lesser for it. *And without that kind of followership there can ultimately be no leadership.*

OCTOBER 1955

## We Won't Have the Time

GENERAL W. B. PALMER  
Address at Governor's Day Observance  
Indiantown Gap Military Reservation  
20 August 1955

Three times during my span of years in uniform the free citizens who compose the 28th Division have been called to active duty in the common defense. At great personal sacrifice, its volunteer soldiers have laid aside their civilian livelihoods and responded to the call. They were willing and eager to take their place in the battle line.

But in each of those wars it was many months before they were ready to do so. They were short in men, and they were short in training. First they had to be recruited up to strength with many thousands of men by Selective Service; next they had to go through weeks of training these recruits; and only after that could the companies, battalions, regiments, train into fighting teams which could handle themselves effectively on the battlefield.

In the past, we have always had the time to do this after we had already declared war.

Now we have reached the middle of the twentieth century of the Christian era, and if there is one thing plain to every man in this year 1955, it is that we no longer have that kind of time at our disposal. Our potential enemies are stronger than any we have faced in the past, and the airplane has shrunk the ocean to a fraction of the size it used to have. We must be ready at a much earlier date, a *much* earlier date; we must be practically ready when a war starts. And this means that we must find ways to have National Guard units at full strength in well trained men before the war begins.

## Appeasement Leads to War

RT. REV. BERNARD J. SHEIL  
Auxiliary Bishop, Archdiocese of Chicago  
St. Louis Post-Dispatch  
30 June 1955

At the present time we are forced to work against great odds. A large part of the world is in the power of a few men who believe and implement an inhuman and godless philosophy of life. In our dealings with them we must avoid the extremes of unbending bellicosity and spineless appeasement. We completely reject appeasement not because we accept war as the only solution to our problems; we reject it because we desire peace. And if there is one lesson that we have learned from recent history, it is that appeasement leads not to peace but to war. This should not surprise us because appeasement, in the last analysis, is connivance with injustice, and peace can never be the result of injustice.

Faced with the fact of communism, we have been forced to accept a new kind of war, the cold war. For the most part, this has been fought by statesmen and diplomats, rather than by military men. This notion of a cold war is new to us, and it has been difficult to accept. We have had little or no experience with its weapons. In such a war there are no clear-cut victories, no unconditional surrenders. It is a difficult battle, fought on the ever-shifting terrain of diplomacy, and daily demanding new tactics. It has achieved one thing—it has kept the world from plunging over the abyss of total destruction. Its successes and failures must be measured according to that standard alone.

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Dissolution was accomplished by mass surrender and desertion. In eight months a million men surrendered or deserted the Imperial Russian Army

**T**HE dissolution of the Imperial Russian Army in 1917 has long remained a mystery to many students of history and to military men. Why a huge military organization, such as the Russian Army of 1917, suddenly collapses, disintegrates, and moves homeward without authority is not easily explained. But an understanding of what happened and how and why is a significant military lesson.

What happened to the Russian Army in 1917 may be explained, at least in part, by the condition of the Russian body politic. The Russians, civilians and soldiers alike, had lost their fighting spirit. When the hatred that is intended to be vented upon the external enemy is instead turned upon certain classes within a nation at war, the will to win cannot long survive.

The breakdown of normal military discipline in the Russian Army had no single precise cause. It was a result of many things: war weariness, hatred of the hard and often humiliating conditions of service, responsiveness to the general mood of discontent in the country. All this explosive stuff was ignited by the stubborn demonstrations of the working-class population of Petrograd.

That the Russian Army was suffering from a fatal infection was apparent to various observers as early as the first

year of the war. The troops in immediate contact with the enemy were woefully short of vital supplies, and as time moved on the situation got worse. By February 1917, Russia had called over 19 million men to the colors. There were not half enough rifles for issue to those inducted.

The low educational level of the Russian peasant soldier made him an easy prey to Bolshevik propaganda. The literacy rate in this vast army was approximately 39 per cent. The average Russian soldier was not equipped to do much thinking on the issues, or able to make discerning judgment.

**S**HORTAGES of ammunition, particularly artillery shells, helped break down discipline and organization, since the shortages were the direct cause of casualties and hardship. Russia's inability to manufacture the sinews of war and the incompetent bureaucracy that handled the supply system certainly helped destroy the will to fight of the Russian soldier.

The moment the Russian soldier felt the pinch of inadequate supplies, he began to believe he had been forgotten and that his sacrifice was of doubtful value. And this fitted what the Bolshevik propagandists were telling him. The old-time Imperial Guards officers were pillars of strength until they were

wounded or killed in action. The war-time officers, many of them from the ranks of the middle-class white-collar workers, had somewhat more "practical" concepts of duty and honor. Many of them preferred the comforts and safety of the enemy prison camps to the discomforts and dangers of the trenches.

The infantry, composed largely of raw peasants, lost its morale and military identification much more rapidly than did the rest of the army. This was because the raw levies were less educated than the cavalry, artillery, and motor units. The more technical arms required a higher number of educated officers and soldiers. Also, the possession of equipment such as horses, guns, and motor vehicles, tended to act as a brake against revolution. Equipment required care, and this exerted a definite disciplinary pattern in the soldier's daily routine, whether at the front or in garrison.

**B**ETWEEN February and October 1917, disintegration swept like an epidemic throughout the army. The masses of peasant infantrymen, hearing continuously about "free land" and the dispossession of the landlords at home, deserted in great numbers. The soldiers from industrial areas were badly infected with the contagious desire



# death of an army

*The diseased condition of the Russian body politic weakened the Imperial Russian Army but it didn't fall apart until discipline was destroyed*

## **COLONEL VIRGIL NEY**

Failures of the Imperial Government so weakened the army that the Bolshevik revolutionists found it easy to infect the ragged, barefoot peasant soldiers with dissatisfaction at their lot and distrust of their officers.

Bolshevik propaganda distributed to soldiers and sailors in rear areas (especially Petrograd) stirred unrest which spread rapidly to combat units and became a mortal infection



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A painting by a Bolshevik artist supposed to show the attack by factory workers, soldiers and sailors on the Winter Palace in Petrograd in 1917

to get back to their factories and to share in the spoils.

In perfect timing with the mutiny of the Russian Army was the "mutiny" of the peasants, who began seizing the land belonging to the landlords. Since the mass of the Russian Army was drawn from the peasantry, it is not hard to understand the common bond between the peasant and the soldier. At home, the villagers marched with pitchforks and axes against their rich landlord neighbors. In the army, one has but to substitute the officer for the landlord.

Much of the disaffection and mutiny began not at the front, but in the large-garrison cities such as Petrograd and Moscow, where the troops were well fed, well housed, and safe from the hazards of front-line duty.

**T**HE front-line troops enthusiastically accepted the seizure of power by the rear-area soldiers. It was a logical reaction to the mass psychosis produced by the cries of "Peace and Land" in the

Bolshevik propaganda. Once the peasant soldier had been inculcated with disaffection, the disaster was completed by the uninterrupted military defeats, the ever-growing realization of the senselessness of the war, the creation and nurturing of a division between officers and men, and finally the regarding of officers as relics of feudal serfdom.

Thus began the mortal sickness which caused the death of the Imperial Russian Army. When the soldier would not trust his officer, when he would not obey his orders, when the outward manifestations of discipline and subordination were eliminated, the army was dead.

General Order No. 1, which was promulgated by the Petrograd Workers' and Soldiers' Soviet, was intended to be applicable to the entire armed forces. But as the order was not observed by many of the well-disciplined, well-officered old army units, the Soviet decreed that General Order No. 1 was for troops of the Petrograd command

only. This order had as much to do with the disintegration of the Russian Army as any other act of the revolutionary committees. In fact, the Provisional Government soon learned of its lethal effect upon the body militant and endeavored to qualify it, but the damage had been done: the rapidly spreading infection had reached the vital areas of discipline, subordination, and order. In *The Russian Revolution, 1917-1921*, W. H. Chamberlin has commented lucidly on General Order No. 1:

Committees were to be elected by the soldiers and sailors of all companies, battalions and other military and naval units. Every military unit was to obey the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies in political demonstrations. Orders of the Military Commission of the Duma were to be executed, except in cases where they contradicted the orders of the Soviet. The company and battalion committees must control all forms of arms and not give them out to officers, even on their demand. Soldiers, while obligated to maintain strict discipline in service, were to be given the same political

and civil rights as other citizens outside the service. Standing at attention and compulsory saluting outside of service were abolished along with the sonorous titles, "Your Excellence," "Your Honor," etc., with which soldiers were formerly supposed to greet soldiers of the higher ranks. Officers were forbidden to use the familiar "thou" in addressing their soldiers.

Although this order [General Order No. 1], according to the eyewitness, Sukhanov, was written under the direct dictation of a group of soldiers, it corresponded closely with several resolutions which had been adopted at a session of the Petrograd Soviet; and it appeared in the Soviet official organ *Izvestia* under the signature of the Soviet. Its publication enhanced the popularity of the Soviet among the soldiers. While some parts of the order might be regarded as harmless and reasonable modifications of the caste discipline of the old army, the clause which took away the control of the arms from the officers could scarcely be reconciled with any kind of military efficiency; and the general spirit of the order was permeated with distrust of the officers as a class. It was at once a symptom and a cause of the rapid disintegration of the military capacity of the Russian Army (already badly shaken by the disasters of poor generalship and inadequate preparedness which marked the conduct of the war) which set in after the March upheaval and was a main contributory factor in the leftward sweep of the revolution.

The disarming and cold-blooded murder of officers who were only trying to do their duty and carry on the war, in accordance with the wishes of the Provisional Government, was of common occurrence. Almost overnight the ignorant peasant-soldier had placed the blame for his entire situation upon his officer, who represented the hated educated class. If the officer sought to maintain military discipline and exact obedience to orders, he was automatically considered to be a supporter of the Tsarist régime.

The ever-reliable rumor technique was used by the Bolsheviks with considerable success. An outstanding example of this is included in the memoirs of General Polovtsev, who commanded the troops of the Petrograd Military District:

A rumor to the effect that all soldiers over forty were to be discharged had got abroad, and an agitation began to make this rumor a reality; as a result, soldiers of forty commenced to desert, and to arrive in the capital with requests for legal discharges. They camped on the Semenovskiy drill grounds, formed companies, founded their own republic, and sent deputations everywhere. Having no success,

they commenced to parade the city, sometimes more than fifty companies at once. Chernov (one of Kerensky's ministers) had encouraged them. Kerensky became enraged and had them driven out. I decided to starve them, and ordered their rations to be stopped. But it turned out that their republic could subsist independently, that they could live from the sale of cigarettes, from carrying baggage at the railroad stations, and the like.

The greater the distance a soldier was from the front, the more susceptible he became to demoralizing influences. Those at the front were still influenced by the herd instinct for protection against the enemy. But as the enemy became a more remote threat, solidarity and obedience became weaker. The germs of the mutiny multiplied most rapidly among the garrison troops at Petrograd, who had never heard a hostile shot nor suffered the bitter winters in the trenches.

The decreasing strength of the Russian Army in the field testifies to the effectiveness of the "desertion fever" which swept its ranks in 1917. Between the dates of 1 January and 1 Septem-

ber of that year, the strength dropped from 6.9 million to 6 million. This loss of almost a million men may be attributed to desertion, especially after the abdication of Nicholas II, the ensuing destruction of his régime, and the publication of General Order No. 1.

**A** REVOLUTIONARY government attempting to continue a war that it has inherited from the régime it has deposed has the double task of fighting the foreign enemy and struggling against continued revolution. Such was the position of the Provisional Government of Russia after the abdication of Nicholas II in 1917. Keeping the home front and the war front occupied with the defeat of the enemy, after military discipline and civil order had melted away, required the sternest measures.

When the threat of death or banishment to Siberia ("where," the Russian soldiers remarked, "we will at least have our skins whole") failed to check the disintegration of the army, the Government turned to psychology. A military intellectual named Batkin proposed

Red troops parading after the announcement of the fall of the Tsar. The sign reads: "Nicholas the Bloody, to the Fortress of Peter and Paul!"

Sovfoto





Russian women turned out to form the Battalion of Death



Revolutionists erect barricades and site artillery in Petrograd

the formation of special shock units of volunteers who were to lead every attack, setting the example for the reluctant masses of unwilling infantrymen. These units were to have dash, *esprit*—all the ingredients of glory—but they never caught on. Honor and glorious destiny had lost out to the mud and blood of the trenches. The stirring music of the regimental bands of the old Imperial Guard had been replaced by the staccato rhythm of the Austrian and German Maxims, and each sound a note of death to Ivan, Michael, or Peter, as he floundered forward to the attack. Battalions of women, trained and led into battle by their own officers, were even organized. These Amazons rendered valiant combat service on the western front, but they had only a negligible effect on the chaos. The cry of "Peace and Land" was too loud.

Meanwhile, the officers of the old Imperial Army did little but stand by and await the inevitable collapse. It is

also doubtful whether the former Imperial Headquarters Staff had any faith in the military posture of the army, after General Order No. 1 had destroyed the foundations of discipline.


So the disintegration proceeded. Once discipline was lost, nothing could halt its course. Kerensky could visit troops at the front and give them a red banner and an eloquent address, but this was no substitute for sound military leadership or tactics. Men do not follow their leaders unless they trust them, and Kerensky himself had destroyed any remnants of trust between officer and enlisted man by permitting General Order No. 1 to be published.

The final disintegration of the Russian Army might have been prevented by General Kornilov, a gallant commander, who proposed to establish a military government and restore discipline. Kerensky at first tended to give his support to this plan, but changed his mind and had Kornilov arrested.

The Bolsheviks took over the government the following month, and the disaster was complete.

THE Provisional Government had become the illegitimate heir of the deposed Tsarist régime and consequently had acquired the obligation of continuing the war. Though poorly supplied and equipped, the army was still capable of inflicting great damage upon the enemy. Though it is highly doubtful whether it could have undertaken a coordinated offensive action, it might have acted as a defensive bulwark against the German and Austrian forces. But, hastened by propaganda and by the effects of General Order No. 1, the Russian Army marched swiftly to final oblivion. Sadly, the proud regiments saw their sacred colors displaced by the red banners of revolution. With muffled drums, it moved irrevocably to its fate and the terrible doom of the Russian Fatherland.





**In war, as in football, the leader needs a few simple, well-rehearsed plays that he doesn't have to create in the huddle**

### **COLONEL HENRY E. KELLY**



**D**URING World War II, in the frontal development of a strongly held town, the advance was stopped by fire dominating the direct, open approach from the south. To the west, a favorable wooded approach led to the outlying houses. A base of fire was established in the wooded area. The assault was then launched over the open terrain. Under cover of this flanking fire, the attack went forward almost without resistance.

The supporting weapons were well sited, but that was not the reason for the success of the operation. Rather, the enemy had been deceived by the simple variation of an expected procedure. He had shifted his defense to meet a typical enveloping attack up the natural route of approach.

In war, as in football, the best results are obtained by having a few simple alternatives to choose from, and then picking the one the enemy least expects. To do this, the leader must have prearranged procedures (or plays) at his finger tips, which are well understood by all.

A quarterback would be greatly

handicapped if he did not have these well-rehearsed plays—if he were restricted to a few preliminary line-up formations. He would be in the helpless position of having to create his plays in the huddle.

But that is the situation today's rifle platoon leader faces. Because of an exaggerated fear that prearranged techniques would lead to stereotyped procedures that the enemy could prepare for and counter, our military texts, while stating many worthy principles, fail to give the details of procedure that alone would give life to the principles.

Some fragmentary procedures for combat training do find their way into our training doctrine, but they give a distorted picture by emphasizing certain phases of combat and omitting others. For example, a good deal of training time is devoted to advance-guard tactics, while no definite procedures have been prescribed for the cross-country advance by bounds required in the development of resistance and the establishment of adequate supporting fires.

I shall attempt here to outline a few

specific procedures for this neglected phase of combat. Comparable procedures can be developed for any other phase. For each situation, or step, not more than three alternatives will be given. Variations can be added as the platoon gains experience.

**A** platoon detailed as a forward unit when contact is imminent should take up its formation while it still is in reasonable safety—for example, as it leaves a defended position or passes through an outpost. Its advance is covered by a security element, consisting of a squad, or, exceptionally, part of a squad, under the command of a designated leader. In the platoon wedge or column formations, the leading squad can be used as security. When the V or line is used, additional security is often needed to avoid being caught between bound objectives in poor terrain.

The security element proceeds by bounds from one suitable position to another. Its leader's first task is to choose the objective of his next bound. This objective should, if possible, have

good observation and a firing position with cover. The length of the bound will depend on the terrain and the nature of the anticipated resistance.

**T**HE security leader now must decide how his men are to advance. If enemy fire is likely, a reconnaissance by fire of likely hostile positions may first be conducted. In any case, all available weapons should cover one man while he makes a short, quick advance to a previously selected position. If the enemy opens fire, the strength of the resistance is further determined by reconnaissance by fire; then, if necessary, by short advances by individuals, designed to draw fire. Careful judgment should be used in ordering these advances. The advance of the platoon must not be stopped by a few long-range rounds fired by a jittery enemy patrol. On the other hand, the security element should not be pushed forward into poor terrain in the face of strong resistance. This decision will not be easy, since a well-trained enemy may well withhold fire until a worthwhile target appears. The crack-thump method of estimating range and direction is helpful training in estimating range and location.

If the terrain is open and the possibility of contact average, the security element should advance by long bounds, using a diamond formation. The depth of this formation helps the platoon leader to maintain contact with and control over his security force while he keeps the rest of the platoon under cover as long as possible.

When both the terrain and the likelihood of contact are average, either the diamond or skirmishers formation may be used by the security. The men will walk, and a base of fire is not established. This method, employing the diamond, is used unless one of the two others is specifically called for. The signal **DOUBLE TIME** can be used for the first procedure, **QUICK TIME** for and second procedure, and **FORWARD** for the third.

**O**NCE the security element has arrived at the objective of the bound, it is deployed in the best available position for observation with double the normal interval between men. Then, in event the command element temporarily closes on it, it moves into the intervals left by the security.

The leader of the security now has to decide whether to await the arrival

of the command echelon. He normally continues the advance unless some unusual condition requiring guidance has arisen. Once he has made his decision, he clears it with the platoon leader by signal. He can give the signal **FORWARD** if he has decided to advance, and **HALT** if not. The platoon leader can reverse the decision by signalling **HALT** and **FORWARD**, respectively.

The command element consists of an eight-man platoon headquarters, occasionally augmented for special purposes. It normally moves one bound behind the security, though it may temporarily merge with the security. In flat, open terrain, to avoid loss of control, the command element may begin its forward movement before the security has reached the next position. To reduce the risk of command and security both being taken under close-range fire while on unfavorable ground, the command element should wait until the security has picked up at least 250 yards before it displaces.

**E**ACH member of the command echelon should be allotted a specific sector of observation, including front, flank, and rear. When the rocket-launcher team is not with the headquarters, the sectors of the remaining men should be increased to insure coverage of the rearward area.

The rest of the platoon is normally divided into assault and support elements. Since the platoon's strength is limited when the wedge is used, no rifle squad will then be included in the support element.

The assault element normally remains in observation, one firing position behind the command element unless the distance between suitable positions is over 200 to 250 yards. In this case, the assault element occupies any suitable cover behind the command element. If no suitable cover exists, it temporarily joins the command element, picking up its distance as the command element moves forward. The assault element also maintains constant all-around observation.

The support regulates its advance upon the assault element. It pays particular attention to observing and protecting the flanks of the assault element. At each position firing positions for the supporting weapons are selected and the weapons squads prepared to occupy them. The 200- to 250-yard distance between elements is for average ground. Over close ground,

positions will obviously be closer; while on open ground, the 250-yard limit can often be exceeded.

**T**RAINING should stress recognition and occupation of suitable objectives for bounds and intermediate cover, maintenance of observation, selection of targets for reconnaissance by fire, and the many other details which require the development of practical skills. Fragmentary situations can be used in early training, which can be applied later in complete field-training problems.

In deciding where to place any supporting weapons which may accompany the platoon during an advance, the advantage of early fire support must be weighed against the danger of immobilizing the weapons in unfavorable terrain. Forward observers for these supporting weapons normally advance by bounds from one observation position to the next. They may well accompany the command element. When the flanks are secure, the weapons squads move with the assault element; otherwise they move with the support. To avoid lateral movement into positions, weapons should be held back until positions areas have been selected. The weapons should move by bounds from the vicinity of one suitable firing position to another. Forward observers can be of assistance in prompt selection of weapons positions.

**W**HEN the security element comes under fire, it must continue its advance unless the accuracy of the fire makes this impossible. As indicated in regulations, artillery, mortar, and long-range small-arms fire can usually be avoided by changes in direction, formation, or pace.

When accurate small-arms fire forces the security to take cover, the security leader must decide promptly whether to conduct a reconnaissance by fire or make any other movement in order to improve his position and develop the situation by drawing fire. If part of the security is in position to fire, it may do so in order to cover the men under fire while they improve their position and to draw fire. If the security is fired upon while close to a good firing position and if a worthwhile target can be located, fire is opened before continuing the advance. These decisions can be made tentatively in advance as the security leader surveys the terrain involved in the bound. Then, if fire is

opened, his tentative plans are adjusted to the situation.

When the entire security is caught on unfavorable ground, the platoon leader must decide whether to place all or part of the assault element in position to cover a movement of the security to a better position, or to continue the advance and thus incidentally take the pressure off the security.

If the first course of action is evidenced by the platoon's opening fire, the security leader promptly chooses a better position and starts his men moving to it. Otherwise, the security element improves its position as much as possible and waits for the platoon to reduce the enemy fire enough for the security to rejoin.

When his security has been stopped, the platoon leader must first decide whether to use the position held by the security to engage his assault element. If he decides against this, he then decides whether to use available supporting fires only or in addition to maneuver to assist his security. If he decides on maneuver, three courses of action are open to him.

**H**E may make a flanking movement, using a nearby approach. This is most promising when time is available and suitable approaches exist. The maneuvering force should have a reasonable chance of reaching its objective without encountering another defensive position.

He may have a small detachment work itself forward along a draw or other approach to take the enemy under fire from a new and unexpected position. This method is particularly effective against isolated automatic weapons. A hand or rifle grenadier, protected by a couple of riflemen, can often take out a machine gun without sustaining a casualty.

Lastly, the platoon leader may reinforce the security for a frontal attack. This method is the least desirable of the three, but frequently may be the only course open. Bold frontal action, supported by all available fire, often gives good results against weak or timid resistance.

Fire support from the rearmost unit that is able to deliver effective fire is most economical from the point of view of ammunition resupply. Artillery support is frequently delivered first, while limited mortar, rocket, and recoilless-rifle ammunition is conserved for later emergency action. The small

size of all weapons squads in the infantry battalion severely limits the amount of ammunition that can be hand-carried.

Development merges into attack as the enemy dispositions become known. Reconnaissance by fire, which can be conducted by all available supporting weapons, should be given full consideration, since it will often give information of the enemy more rapidly, and certainly less expensively, than will maneuver of rifle units.

Every time the forward element meets resistance that stops it or decisively slows it down, the platoon leader must decide how best to employ the rifle squad or squads in his support element. His choices in general are those previously considered for the support of the security.

One possibility is to envelop the resistance on either flank. This is often impractical because of the limited size of the force, lack of time, the location of enemy positions, or for other reasons. When this method is used, the fire support should be carefully coordinated with the maneuver. If the support element moves down a corridor, the fire of all hostile weapons not specifically covering the approach is automatically defiladed. All available supporting weapons should therefore neutralize the enemy weapons sited on the approach. Units moving up an approach must control both crests and avoid movement along the corridor floor.

**A**NOTHER way in which the support element may come to the aid of the assault element is by frontal attack. This does not necessarily mean a walking advance of riflemen. Against noncontinuous minor resistance, one portion of the attacking element can elbow its way forward to a firing position from which it can cover the advance of another portion. Forward observers can place concentrations on located resistance. A skillfully delivered frontal attack of this kind may prove less costly and more effective than an envelopment.

Finally, a small base of fire may be moved forward to knock out a key-point, or the platoon leader may decide to request help by supporting weapons or troops not under his control. It is futile to throw a small support against a strong position.

The current doctrine that a good tentative assault position can be selected before the attack is launched is

unduly optimistic except in stable situations. The exact location will depend upon many factors, including the ground, the supporting fires, the location and nature of the resistance, and the skill of the attacker.

The neutralizing effect of the supporting fires can be increased by delivery of the preparation fires in phases, with breaks between each phase to tempt the enemy to man his weapons. A series of such interruptions not only causes additional casualties, but also discourages the early opening of defensive fires when the assault is actually launched.

Recent tests have shown that short-range assault fire delivered from an underarm position while advancing is more effective than fire from the shoulder. Brief but intensive training in this type of fire overcomes the instinctive tendency to fire very high and markedly improves results. Previously trained grenade-bayonet teams are of great assistance in mopping up. The knowledge that these teams are ready increases troop confidence.

The platoon leader should receive skull practice of the type used for drilling a football quarterback, to enable him to select the proper maneuver in a given situation. He should be given a brief analysis of the situation and required to select the most suitable procedure and justify his choice. In another valuable form of training, platoon or squad field exercises can be run on a sandtable or ground map. Orders are issued orally as they would be on the field. Each participant is represented by a symbol such as a match stick or other simple device. The individuals involved move their symbols or issue orders in turn as required by the situation. This system develops many of the problems of actual combat which would be lost in a loose general discussion.

**I**HAVE presented here only one of several possible approaches to tactical training for an important phase of combat. Present tactical training fails to develop the experience in specific procedures that is eventually developed in combat. The Army as a whole needs such procedures as a part of its training program. They should be based on the rifle platoon because the squad is normally engaged as a unit in the platoon. Teamwork among the squads of the rifle platoon is difficult to achieve, but it is essential and well worth practice.



## IRONS IN THE FIRE

# Insurance for Future Production

**GENERAL W. B. PALMER**

The Vice Chief of Staff, formerly the Deputy Chief for Logistics, explains the Army's "shadow plant" program

**D**URING World War II the armed forces of the United States acquired some 900,000 machine tools. Immediately after the war a great cry was raised that all this equipment must be thrown open to purchase by industry so as to get the civilian economy restored; and all of it was thrown on the market, thus wrecking the machine tool industry and the armed forces war reserve with one and the same monkey wrench.

The Army was left with the residue of unwanted production equipment, none of it composing integrated production lines, just the odds and ends that nobody wanted to buy. With that sort of a war reserve we entered the Korean War in 1950, and back we all went into the familiar boom-and-bust cycle. You machine-tool men couldn't do a thing but pick up your weary load once more and come along with us. And you did, of course, just as you always have. . . . It all added up to this: for the third time in the twentieth century, we had gone to war with practically no war production base in existence.

**N**OW in things like this, it is certainly not the fault of the machine-tool industry; nor is it really the fault of the government. It is a matter of public opinion—of public pressure—and of public education. A sufficient number of the people who influence the affairs of this country have to understand the problem. I believe that the Korean War and the commotion about

ammunition in 1953 had a very marked effect; because now for the first time the Army is being allowed to place its production equipment in reserve for a war emergency.

The Army at present owns 400,000 pieces of production equipment, of which at least 150,000 are machine tools. And we intend, as we close down production, to retain and store the greater part of it, packaged in integrated assembly lines. We have already put away about half of it. In other words, when the next war emergency arises, we shall have on hand our production lines for many types of weapons, combat vehicles, and ammunition, without waiting for the machine-tool industry to climb one of these enormous peaks. . . .

**W**E have developed three different techniques for handling this standby program of ours:

The first is to leave our integrated production lines in place, in a plant, under power. You might say we turn the key in the door, and once a month or so we go back in and turn over the machines, just to keep everything in working order. So the whole plant is ready to go when we need it.

The second technique involves storing an integrated production line right at the plant where it will be used if mobilization comes. We push it over to the wall, or store it in a quonset hut right outside. Those production lines, too, are ready to go on minimum notice. They are in the hands of the management which will be responsible for using them in wartime.

The third technique is to package an entire production line for central storage by the Army. These lines are usually associated with a given management in a given plant. They would be shipped to the site of use when

war came. We also store selected individual tools, which are not part of a production line but which are universally useful.

Apparently these programs have not been fully understood. The standby program and the package reserve program are relatively limited and they are really only "insurance." These are proven production lines for critical items only. These production lines are intended to take just the first shock of mobilization.

Of course, by the time a war broke out, the tools in these standby production lines might not be quite as fast and efficient as some you will be showing over the years to come. But these production lines of ours have been operated. The "bugs" have been worked out of them. They will produce what we need. Right now they are only three to four years old, on the average, which is pretty good. And as the years go by, the only way newer tools would be more advantageous, for these standard items of ours, would be that they use less manpower; we have already accommodated the rates of production of the present tools in our planning. But in a mobilization, our manpower problem does not become acute until the second year.

**W**HEN mobilization comes, we shall put these tools to work producing—at the same time we place our orders for the latest and best tools—in an orderly fashion, so that we can start using the new tools for high speed production with less manpower around the end of the first year. Between now and then, perhaps you will have gone through several cycles of development. This way, we shall be able to buy the latest and best at the outbreak of a war when our very lives may depend upon it.

Condensed from an address at a luncheon of the American Machine Tool Distributors' Association





# The Lieutenant and His Men

ELI GINZBERG



**Manpower in the mass can be effectively used and conserved only by leaders who understand the individual man—why he is as he is. And the key to it all is the character of the leader himself.**

**W**HY should you as officers in the United States Army be concerned with the manpower problem? You well know that the efficiency of the Army depends on matériel, manpower, organization, and strategy and tactics. By now you must also know that manpower is one of the strategic elements of an efficient fighting force. But until very recent times manpower was a neglected area in the history of the U.S. Army.

What can we extract from Army history about the manpower problem? Not so many days ago, I ran across a few amusing points. At one time during the Civil War the only criteria for selection for military service were minimum height and weight. There was no age criterion at all for the Army, and the Marine Corps enlisted boys of nine. In World War I, the first efforts were made at psychological screening. That is, a man had to pass an examination to get into the Army. There was a famous Alpha and the famous Beta tests which were used to indicate whether a man had enough intelligence to distinguish left from right and front from back. Many men failed! Just in passing, it was largely out of this military experi-

ence of World War I with its initial efforts at psychological screening that there developed the broad field of personnel psychology.

The Regular Army used to attract a large number of marginal people. Between the two world wars, a strange collection of men enlisted in the Army. How strange, I can illustrate by a story that General Snyder tells. He served at West Point as surgeon for many years and in recent years has been the President's personal physician. He is also Adviser to the Conservation of Human Resources Project. During World War II, when he was Assistant The Inspector General, he went with General Sultan, then The Inspector General, to look at one of our convalescent hospitals. At that time we had some very special installations to take care of men who got nervous in the service. There were large numbers of them. General Sultan was very interested to observe these neuropsychiatric casualties, so General Snyder arranged for him to meet a large group of these patients. General Sultan took one look at them and exclaimed, "My God! Wouldn't we have given our eyeteeth to have people like this in the old Regular Army!"

**F**ROM here on, I can talk a little bit more from direct experience. Between World War I and World War II and particularly during the 1930s, Army planning was based on the assumption that there would never be a shortage of manpower. How could there be? The country was suffering from a tremendous depression, whose worst characteristic was large-scale unemployment. So the Army presumed that, whatever the exigency, there would be no trouble on

the manpower front. The Army not only made its plans on that assumption; it actually continued on this basis even after we entered the war.

A few figures can point up this situation. During World War II, 18 million men were screened. Of that number, 3 million were declared physically unfit for military service, and another 2 million were defined as unsuitable for military service because they were illiterate or because they suffered from a real or supposed emotional instability. And another million men who were taken into the armed services were prematurely separated because of mental or emotional deficiencies while the war was still on. That is, 3 million men out of 18 million failed to serve in the armed services effectively for mental or emotional reasons. This is a lot of manpower, and this is what led President Eisenhower when he was at Columbia to recommend that we study the manpower problem. You probably know that currently the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force are using higher mental standards than prevailed during World War II. Among the reasons for this is the necessity to attract men who have enough background to be able to go to technical schools and perhaps to encourage a reasonable number of them to determine upon a military career.

One more point by way of introduction as to why manpower is important and will probably become crucial. The President has indicated on several occasions that he believed, with the current developments in nuclear weapons, the large division of yesterday will no longer be appropriate; a smaller division or the regimental team may well become the key. The success of these

This article is drawn from a paper Dr. Ginzberg delivered to the First Classmen at the U. S. Military Academy

smaller units will depend primarily on the skill and flexibility of the individual officer and man.

One can postulate that the contribution that can be made by research and development toward raising the level of military efficiency will be set by the ability of men to use the new weapons and to adapt themselves to the new-found strategy. A very good example comes to mind. A few years ago I served on a review committee of the Operations Research Office for the Secretary of the Army. In that connection, we learned that certain good new signal equipment was not being used in Korea, and for a very simple reason. It was too complicated. In battle, the men found it preferable to use the old World War II equipment. There was not enough technical competence among the men to use the extremely modern and advanced equipment effectively.

These illustrations, hopefully, will convince you why manpower should be central rather than peripheral to your concern.

**N**OW let's consider the kind of men you will find in the Army. The United States is a very large country which has many regional differences. Not everyone was brought up exactly as you were. It is important that you have a basic tolerance for and understanding of these differences. This is a very important lesson. Let me illustrate it by an experience from World War II. A considerable number of New York psychiatrists were assigned to Army induction stations where their job was to interview boys from the Appalachian hill country. The psychiatrist might start the interview by attempting to have a chatty conversation with the prospective draftee, but this was often met by a blank stare. The doctor would then ask a few questions, only to elicit the same blank stare. As a result, the doctor might label the man as psychologically unfit for military service, whereas in fact the boy might simply not have understood the New Yorker's words. There are regional differences!

We all have prejudices. It is inevitable. It is part of life. But one of the signs of maturing is when we start to recognize that certain of our attitudes became ingrained before we were able to think for ourselves. You ought to face these attitudes with facts, and when they fail to match, begin to shed your prejudices.

Now I want to stress that different individuals have different strengths and different weaknesses. One of the things to remember is that certain strong people will do poorly when they are assigned to certain kinds of work, and certain people who are weak according to one rating system may do very well in a different work situation. It is important to appreciate this fact about the differences among individuals and therefore to avoid blanket judgments.

I want to introduce one variable in any system of rating on the basis of academic or relative performance: that is ambition. It is possible for a bright lad to be smart and lazy just as well as smart and ambitious. That is, in addition to natural endowment and ability to learn, there is the important factor of whether or not a person is willing to work. I have been a teacher all my life, and I have never been impressed with people who do very well on examinations. That single fact alone is not crucial. I want to know whether ambition goes along with ability because the two are complementary; if you are smart but lazy, the odds will be against your success. If you have only average ability but are very energetic, your chances of success are greater.

**N**OW I want to discuss selective personnel problems that you are likely to encounter in your careers. I would like to begin with a reference to General Bradley's book in which he relates how he was unable to get the 90th Division to fight on the Continent. He relieved the commander. The Division still would not fight. He put another division commander in and the unit still would not fight. His staff advised him to break up the division, but he refused. He said that the division was made up of an average cut of manpower who had been trained as well as any other division. He said it was not the men's fault, it was the commander's fault. He changed division com-

manders three times before the division got moving. Then it fought very well. In short, as an introduction to some of the personnel problems that you will encounter, I would like to stress as General Bradley pointed out, that the efficiency of your unit depends upon you—very little upon the men who are in it.

I would like to indicate to you very rapidly five areas of concern and three kinds of problem soldiers that you will probably encounter. The most important area of concern for you will be the selection of your NCOs. In this connection, it will be important to remember all the things which, hopefully, you have learned about shedding your prejudices and preconceptions. But the most important point to keep in mind is that your noncommissioned officers are not appointed in order to make life easy for you. They are supposed to help you organize a good unit and keep it in shape. The noncommissioned officer must have a good relationship with his men and it is your job to pick one who can develop such a relationship.

So far as training is concerned, it is important to remember that many men who will be assigned to your unit will be below average in their ability to learn, just as there will be others who will have the ability to learn much more quickly than the average. The Army, with its large numbers, must plan in terms of the average. But you will have some latitude. The slow learner will not be able to stand much pressure. On the other hand, the bright man will require stimulation, or boredom will destroy his efficiency. If you exercise a little bit of imagination, to distinguish the slow from the fast learners, you will be in a fine position. You can then use the smart ones to help train the slow ones and everybody will feel much happier.

**T**AKE the problem of job assignment. That is not a job for a corporal in the personnel section. This is always your job. You must concern yourself with men who may be overassigned or underassigned. You may have very good men in your unit. But if they are assigned to duties which demand too much or too little, or for which they are ill equipped, their worth is dissipated. Men who are unhappy in their jobs are inefficient. It is your job to estimate your men's capacities and assign them accordingly within such lati-



G. WALKER

tude as may be within your authority.

The fourth consideration relates to your responsibility for encouraging good men who are assigned to you to further their own careers. Unfortunately, the obverse often happens in the Army. It is unfair to block a man in his normal progress in order to protect yourself. But it often happens that an officer will declare that a man who is doing a good job is indispensable, just to save himself the trouble of training another fellow. One officer who rose very high in the Army did that during the war. He got an excellent staff and then refused to release any of them, thereby depriving three or four men of earning their stars. That was a disservice to the Army, it was a disservice to those men, and actually it was a disservice to the commander, because as you act toward the individual so you will be judged by the group.

The last problem area I will mention is that of discipline. If you are young, and still inexperienced, you will find this a very difficult problem. It may help you to remember that most of your soldiers are civilians on loan to the Army. They are not making a career in the Army; they are soldiers under duress of one sort or another. So take it easy with them. The best advice that I can give you on the question of discipline is to tell you to see *The Caine Mutiny*. If you cannot see the motion picture, read the book.

**N**OW to shift from problem areas to problem soldiers. What kind of problem soldiers are you likely to encounter? The first type will be those who are known in an adjutant general's language as the inapt. This characterizes the men who find great difficulty in performing effectively. My colleague and I wrote a book entitled *The Uneducated*, which is a study of these people, though not everyone who is uneducated is inapt. We discovered, however, that if these people receive a certain amount of support, they are able to function effectively. If training of slow learners is geared to their capacities, if they can understand the instructor, they will become pretty good soldiers. The inapt are limited only in degree; they will respond to special attention, so if you go easy most of them will be able to make the grade.

The more difficult problem soldier will be the emotionally upset—in the surgeon's language, the psychoneurotic. These are not "crazy" people who have



a brain defect; they are simply individuals, many of them quite young, who more often than not are a little scared by being suddenly separated from home. I visited an induction station in southern Georgia about two years ago to observe current procedures. I saw forty youngsters from southern Georgia farms who had never been farther away from their homes than the neighboring town. Suddenly they found themselves in a line of strangers; they were jabbed, examined, and tested, shouted at, and ordered around. It was nerve-racking.

Many men require a certain amount of support, particularly those who come from upset homes. One soldier may have left a sick mother; another may be worried because his girl friend has not written to him for weeks. Anything you can do to relieve their minds during these early weeks will be helpful; perhaps you can get a Red Cross report on the sick mother, perhaps you can get a letter for the second soldier. This kind of support is particularly important during the period before the group has formed and established a group morale which later can help to support these individuals. One of the troubles is that a man comes into the Army as an individual. It takes time for the smaller group to form, as you well know from your own experience. One of your jobs is to try to get many of these uncertain men over the initial hurdles.

**I**N addition to the inapt and the emotionally upset, you will encounter men who are behavior problems. It is important to remember that for the most part you are dealing with adolescents. Adolescence has been defined as a period of general insanity without specific cause and from which most people get cured without special treatment other than time. But during the period, disturbed behavior can be expected from most. Some youngsters go out and get drunk. I was once told of two men who requested release from the stockade at Fort Benning in order to fight. They went to Korea; and turned out to be two of the best. They were young, they had gotten drunk and broken into a store, and they were penalized for it. But they were not hardened criminals. You will probably encounter a number of such disorderly adolescents, and it is important to remember that that is what they are. On the other hand, when you find that a man is constantly in trouble, a repeater, you will have to recognize that nothing you can do will help him and that probably some kind of administrative or medical discharge is necessary. But this is not likely to be the case with most eighteen-year-olds; the repeaters will show up at times of full mobilization, when the Army consists largely of men in their twenties and thirties.

Why should you as an officer in the Army concern yourself about the inapt, the psychoneurotic, the behavior problem? Why would it not be better to discharge them all? The reason is that, in the last analysis, the Army's mission in times of peace or partial mobilization is primarily a preparatory and training mission. It is geared to the eventuality that you may be forced to meet the challenge of full mobilization. This means that it is necessary for you to learn how to work with these problem soldiers now, in order to be able to deal with them if it becomes necessary—in the event of a major emergency. Then it will be too late to learn. These years constitute your training period, so take advantage of them. Moreover, the challenge from a personnel and management point of view is to elicit extraordinary performance from the average; selecting extraordinary people and having them perform in an average way is no trick.

**A**S you mature, you will find that you must be concerned primarily with two things. The first is the desirability

(Continued on page 52)

## CEREBRATIONS

### Summer Training, Not Summer Camp

**W**E who are associated with the ROTC program have perverted the summer camp. From the objective of "supplementing the instruction received by the student at the institution by applicatory training in order to qualify him for appointment as an officer in the Army Reserve or the Regular Army and to serve in the Active Army," we have warped its purpose to a medium for "selling the Army."

This salesmanship is wasted, for the ROTC cadet is already "sold." He has made a contract with his country and during the three years prior to summer camp he has demonstrated his intention of fulfilling his obligations as a potential reserve officer. An encouraging number have said they want to make the Army their career. The present crop is as patriotic as was mine of 1940. But we are unsure of the Army's attraction for today's collegian, so we color and gloss the cadet's only view of the Army—summer camp—before we commission him. In our "military-minded" enthusiasm we fail to carry out the objective of summer camp, and so deny to the Army's largest source of officers the real value of a hard plebe year, boot camp, or basic training.

I maintain that before an ROTC cadet can qualify for appointment as an officer of any branch, he must demonstrate these minimum requirements: technical knowledge, courage, stamina, and leadership.

All senior ROTC institutions have good academic programs. The instructors are as proficient and devoted as any group of officers in the Army. The training support given the institutions by military districts up

through the chain of command is outstanding. To a certain extent, it is possible to determine technical knowledge at the institution. However, at no school is a cadet expected to prove his leadership as a small-unit commander, to demonstrate his courage, to develop his stamina, or to extend much of his theoretical training into the practical. The Department of the Army designates summer camp as the crucible for determining if the cadet should be an officer. But instead of being an iron crucible, summer camp is cotton candy.

Besides the leadership needed to march his fellow cadets to retreat parade, how much supervised practical work is offered the cadet during six weeks of camp? The leaders' reaction course is admirable. It lasts one day! The answer depends upon the camp concerned, but at no camp is it nearly enough. As for stamina, how many cadets go on ten-mile marches with full pack? Or, if they fall out on the march, how many are required to complete the march at another time? Do we require a swimming test or a PT test? Good peacetime tests for courage are the mock tower, the old AFF tests, the infiltration course, or the close-combat course. Have you ever seen a current summer camp offering such tests? More important, we fail miserably in providing the applicatory work.

There is a poor concept of practical work in a course of instruction which, for two hours, reviews material already exhaustively covered in the classroom; which objectively tests the reviewed material for thirty minutes; and which then rushes the cadet through demonstration stations for the rest of the period. In qualification-in-arms training we speed him through

the PMI phase in too short a time. Part of this time is wasted by reviewing disassembly, nomenclature, and functioning. I doubt if fifty per cent of the cadets qualify the first time. The fact that all cadets qualify the second time they fire (always the next Saturday morning) proves very little. I suggest that the objective of summer camp as relates to firing the M1 would be better carried out by a minimum of "jawbone" and a maximum of familiarization firing. It would be better to postpone qualification in arms until the new officer reaches his branch school. The greatest mistakes in today's summer camps are the excessive review of material covered at the school, and the proclivity for the explanation, demonstration, and examination stages of instruction. It is possible for an imaginative cadet to spend six week watching *others* twist radio knobs, splice wires, fire mortar rounds, drive vehicles—even dig foxholes. He might just as well vacation in a projection room and watch training films.

We should emphasize field duty. It is misrepresentation to increase items of the standard ration by twenty-five per cent. It is unrealistic to use company funds exclusively for beer parties (one Army commander has stopped them). It is unwise to turn a service club over to cadets exclusively. It is ridiculous to put the PIO photographer on the level of the range officer. The point is that we are all trying too hard to sell and have moved off on a tangent. Camp should not be easy because no cadet expects it to be easy. He knows he will have to lead men who have been tested, and he wants to be tested before he has to lead.

I offer this solution: Give a team of experienced PMSTs the mission of



modifying the basic training ATP. They know the level in theoretical training reached by the third-year ROTC cadet. They will know how to set up a six-week program devoid of repetitious lectures and full of practical work. They will add the tests necessary to determine courage and develop stamina. They won't mother the cadets, but will answer the cadets' expectation of something more than a summer camp.

EX-ASSISTANT PMST

## Communications Are Not Logistics

SINCE publication of my article, "The Commander's Communications" [February], I have received quite a number of letters and even a few phone calls concerning it. Several of my correspondents wondered if there was any significance to the article's appearance in the same issue with General Palmer's "The Evolution of Management for Logistics." I have assured them it was "just the way the ball bounced." I feel there is more, however, that should be told these readers in order to clarify the issues.

Communicators should see clearly that the "Palmer concept" was closely related to the attitude of commanders which was deplored in my article. This, I believe, was not so much of a disagreement in concept between the communicator and the "G4 Commandos" as it would appear. Obviously the management problem at DA level is quite different from that in the field. The Chief Signal Officer is spending so much of Uncle Sugar's sugar that his operating responsibilities are necessarily overshadowed by the "men, materials and money" involved in providing communications, electronic, meteorological and photographic services, supplies and equipment for the entire Army, as well as for other governmental departments.

A matter which will surely bother all these communicators, and rightly so, is the organizational concept for the field army which Brig. Gen. C. S. Harris described in "The Theater Support Command" [May]. This article showed me a glaring inconsistency when it stated, "The basic concept is to make 'logistics the servant of tactics—not the master,'" and then it proceeds to put the senior signal officer of a field army in the support command. This will surely cause the communications-logistics "tail" to wag the operational-communications "dog."

Let me say here and now that I am not opposed to the general concept of this organization. Further, I am fully in accord with its objectives with respect to control of the support areas and the dispositioning and direct hauling of supplies—including signal class II and class IV supplies.

It seems appropriate, though, to ask, What is the relationship between communications-electronics and logistics? Can the former be blanketed into the latter term? This is being done commonly but, from my view, to the detriment of communications. As a matter of fact, there was a reference to the common and illogical practice of considering all technical services alike which was deleted from the manuscript of my "The Commander's Communications."

Let us see if I can demonstrate that it is wrong to treat communications as just another logistical support function. First is this statement out of FM 110-10 not true? "Military operations and military communications are integral and inseparable. Communications must be provided and maintained as required to obtain maximum overall effectiveness of the forces consistent with the projected rate of activity and scope of operations." As a fundamental principle subscribed to by all the armed services, I think we should accept this statement as valid.

Based on the above principle then, does not this statement from FM 100-5 logically follow? "The commander is responsible for the establishment and maintenance of the signal communications system of his unit and for its efficient operation as a part of the system of the next higher command."

In view of the above quotations, how can we consider communications as "logistics" in the statement in the Harris article? "Combat commanders should be relieved of maximum . . . logistics functions so that they may devote their attention to the primary mission of defeating the enemy." (The "mission of defeating the enemy" is here synonymous with "military operations.") The commander can be relieved of logistics functions; he cannot be relieved of operational functions, of which communications and electronic warfare are integral parts. I submit, then, that "communications" are not "logistics." There are, however, communications logistics of which the commander and his operational staff can well be relieved.

The senior signal officer of the field

army belongs on the staff of the army commander. He must work closely with all the Gs. After years of opposition, I have finally come to the point where I recommend he be the G5, as in the Navy he is the N5. I now feel that this is the only way to negate the ignorance and indifference which presently make it increasingly more difficult to provide a field commander with the communications-electronics required in the Atomic Age.

COL. DAVID P. GIBBS

## I'm a Specialist

I WAS a sergeant first class since the latter part of 1953, and before that sergeant, corporal, and first lieutenant. Now I am a Special First Class.

Since 1953 I have been in charge of the G4 billets at Seventh Army headquarters. Also, since the organization of enlisted companies here, I have been in charge of a platoon. Prior to this I was an officer for six years, serving as detachment commander, platoon leader, executive officer, and assistant depot commander—all of which required supervision of troops.

Since returning to the service in 1950 I have gone to the stenography school at Fort Harrison, Indiana. After that I worked as a stenographer for an Army commander, and creditably I believe. I feel that attending such a school is a definite asset to both the enlisted man and the Army. However, the policy behind the specialist stripes seems to belie this theory.

In an attempt to salvage my NCO title, I went before a board and presented my side of the story. I felt it was degrading to put a man in this position, but the officers argued that it was not being looked at in that manner and I shouldn't feel that way about it. However, if I wanted to change my MOS I could do so and thereby retain my NCO status. But would it make sense to throw my planned career out the window because of this overhaul in Army policies regarding stripes? I feel it is much more important to continue my planned career.

Publications regarding specialist stripes indicate that to become a specialist is a demotion, because they say any time a man feels he can qualify he may be laterally "promoted" to NCO grade. Does this mean that for all my efforts over this period I get a demotion just because I happen to be a school-trained stenographer? Further humiliation comes from the fact that

a corporal can tell a specialist first class that he actually ranks him. I find myself in a peculiar position because the very men I have been in charge of all these years now look upon me almost with scorn, and are, according to regulations, supposed to tell me what to do. In my case it is similar to losing a command. Now, because we have only one NCO in our platoon, they want me to take over as assistant platoon sergeant, when I'm not supposed to have any troop duty whatsoever. What do I do when some corporal comes along and fails to obey an order I might give him?

I sincerely think that the specialist problem should be given more serious study at the level where the study will do more good. I think surveys should be made at army headquarters, division headquarters, and other places where the change might have a heavy impact.

SPEC 1/C A. LINCOLN BYARS

### In Defense of Army Schools

I FEEL that Captain Dobsevaige in his Cerebration on the Army's school system [August] did a great deal of generalizing.

As a member of the staff of the Officers' Department, The Signal School, having served tours as student and member of the faculty, I disagree with a number of his criticisms.

The views I express are entirely drawn from personal observations and are my own.

The general policy in the Officers' Department of The Signal School is to assign home work or study assignments based on an average of fifteen minutes home study for each hour of classroom instruction. This would require an officer to spend approximately two hours of study each night. A study of the requirements of most colleges and universities would reveal that the average student spends at least two hours studying each night, and in many cases, three to four hours. Certainly if the institutions of higher learning, where educational methods are perfected, follow this pattern, why shouldn't Army schools?

Students at The Signal School are encouraged to present their views and ideas on the topic being presented in class. Instructors are subjected to an intensive course in instructional methods before teaching. In this instructors' course a great deal of time is devoted to the techniques of drawing out the student's comments and ideas. The majority of the classroom (as op-

posed to laboratory) hours are of the conference type rather than the pure lecture. This creates an atmosphere conducive to participation by the class.

Instructors are encouraged to devote considerable time to research in their subject specialty and preparation of new ideas and methods to employ while teaching, in order to avoid the boring verbatim presentations common to repetitious teaching of a subject day after day. Another method of avoiding these boring presentations is used: the cross-training program for instructors, whereby an instructor understudies the subject or specialty of another instructor. Then he teaches this subject when he becomes sufficiently proficient. This method prevents him from getting into that age-old rut. (Such a method will be hotly argued against by advocates of specialization.)

The so-called "canned situations" as used by TSS are situations which have been experienced by members of the faculty in the field. These situations, before being put into use, are screened for validity with an eye toward future developments and operations. It is this type of practical exercise that develops creative thinking and the imaginative presentation of the student's views and ideas; whereas, the development of the situation by the instructor alone leaves the student with the impression that the school solution is the only way (which we know is not the case in all actual field situations).

As with most controversial articles, there are some points which cannot be disputed. This holds true for Captain Dobsevaige's ideas relating to examining methods. Without a doubt, the essay-type exam gives a truer test of the student's knowledge of a subject and provokes his ability to plan and organize his thoughts. Although I believe the percentage of passing students would be greater than 40 per cent, I base that belief on the caliber and background of the majority of officers entering TSS at present.

Regarding the question of having a permanent faculty at each school, it is a time proven fact that an army needs its experienced and battle proven officers, who are capable of effectively commanding and maneuvering large numbers of men. Where but from among our senior officers do we find such men? The idea of a permanent faculty is sound, but I don't believe it is practical.

LT. BERNARD E. FULLER

## THE LIEUTENANT AND HIS MEN

(Continued from page 49)

of learning more and more about the problems of people, and the second is the advantage which will accrue to you from increasing your skill in dealing with the people you will encounter. The first demands an interest and a will; the second has to do with what you can learn to increase your competence. If you really convince yourself that manpower is a key area, the problem of learning more about it should not be too difficult. You can learn from older officers, although you will have to be selective as to whom you imitate. And you can learn from older sergeants; on occasion you may even learn more from older sergeants than from older officers, since they are frequently closer to the men. You can learn from both. You will have to learn from books. And you will have to learn by introspection.

You must keep your minds open to the civilian world because, as I said before, you will be handling primarily civilians on loan to you. If you approach your problems solely as a professional member of the Army, you may overlook the interests and desires of the men who come in from civilian life and who are anxious to return to it. These are civilians first and last, and your problem is to make them soldiers. They will be more effective soldiers as you broaden your understanding of them.

I want to warn you against a reliance on gadgeteering. I have seen the Army grow from an institution with few personnel services and limited management techniques to one which utilizes very elaborate services and techniques. The Army now has huge machines that tabulate detailed records; there are endless statistical reports; there is the work-load study which I helped introduce into the Army during World War II. These are all gadgets. And, like all gadgets, they are helpful to the extent that you are the master of them. If you rely upon them, they will only mislead you.

The final key to the problems which confront you is your own character. In the end, your success will be a function of self-criticism, of objectivity, of your sense of justice, of your understanding and respect for others. In short, as Shakespeare wrote in "Hamlet," if you are true to yourself, you cannot be false to any man.

# 10 | This Concerns You

## CMD: What It Is and What It Does

While this series of articles has certainly made the work of Career Management Division better known, many officers still have a vague and incomplete understanding of the activities of CMD. For that reason, our report this month is in the form of a recapitulation of the task of CMD, written by Major Charles E. Spragins of that office.—THE EDITORS.

**C**AREER Management Division's activities fall naturally into four parts: missions, assignments, schools, and miscellaneous.

### Missions

**T**HE primary mission of CMD is to help keep the Army operating efficiently through carefully considered assignments of officers. The secondary mission is to develop professional capacities of officers to their highest level by intelligently planned and progressive assignment. A tertiary mission is to be prepared to make appropriate assignments in the event of national mobilization or war.

Unfortunately, the title, "Career Management Division," implies the reverse priority of missions. We try to give each officer a balanced sequence of assignments, to include command duty, staff duty, and instructor duty. For several reasons, our batting average is not quite 1.000. For example, an officer's record shows he needs command, we assign him to a CONUS unit in a command MOS, but do not assign him to command a specific unit. That decision is a prerogative of the local commander. So it is possible that the officer will wind up in a staff job.

Another example: Let's assume Fort Bliss has an urgent need for 100 radar officers and we have a radar-trained officer coming home from overseas. He will probably go to Fort Bliss, unless some other overriding consideration exists. Surprisingly enough, some officers don't like to get varied assignments. Not long ago, a captain objected to his assignment as a company commander after having had six years' supply experience. In reviewing his record, we found he had excellent reports,

but all in supply work. Yet his assignment to command was exactly what his career needed.

In assigning officers overseas the same principle applies. We may assign an officer overseas in a command MOS, but it is the prerogative of the overseas commander to assign him to a specific unit or type of duty.


### Assignments

**H**OW are assignments made? Before getting specific, we should mention several factors which limit our flexibility: (1) Our primary mission as stated above. (2) Officer assignments by area (CONUS and overseas) are completely dependent upon the worldwide locations of elements of the Army. We can't all serve in Southern California or Gay Paree. The length of tours in overseas areas has a definite bearing on the size of our monthly or annual requirements to that particular area. (3) The number of officers assigned to each type of duty is determined by a branch's portion in the over-all Army mission. Using the appropriate pattern (TM 20-605) as guidance, career branches attempt to insure that each officer receives a


liberal variety of on-the-job training. The charts on these pages represent an approximation of the percentage of officers by branch, grade, and years of service, who are currently assigned to various types of duty.

**A**S is apparent from the charts, there is no specific years-of-service bracket during which an officer will receive a particular type of assignment. However, by analysis of the appropriate chart, an officer can obtain a general idea of what he might expect in the way of future assignments.

Now for some specifics. The new officer's assignment preference statement is good, and we use it for its intended purpose. Every officer should fill it out completely and accurately, indicating his desires, *not* what he *doesn't* want. In determining each officer's assignment we try to reconcile three considerations: the desirable career pattern; the officer's desires; and the existing requirements. Whenever possible, we make assignments that fulfill all three considerations. You'd be surprised at the large number of assignments that meet most of these factors. Proper assignments don't make







good officers' club conversation, so the only ones you hear about are the ones that start out: "They really fixed me . . ." I repeat that the preference statement is important and certainly helps determine an assignment.

How are selections for overseas made? The Army's fundamental policy is that all officers will serve their proportionate share of foreign service both in desirable and undesirable areas.

In making these overseas assignments, each branch keeps a vulnerability roster. This lists the officers by grade and by date of return from desirable and undesirable areas. When making assignments to an area such as Europe, those officers at the top of the list (who have been in CONUS the longest) are the first to be assigned to Europe. Exceptions: officers in stabilized tours will normally complete their tours before going overseas, and attendance at school will delay overseas shipment until completion of the course.

ONE of our biggest present problems is the fact that we sent about a ten year supply of officers through Korea in three or four years. This has caused desirable-area returnees to spend a little more than a year in the States before moving on to Korea, whereas returnees from Korea are spending three, four, and five years in the States before being assigned to a desirable area, such as Europe. The current short Korea tour further aggravates this situation, and unless troop rede-

ployments are made before long, we may be forced to send undesirable theater returnees to Korea.

Reassignment action on overseas returnees begins from about three to six months before the officer returns home. The same three considerations—requirements, career needs, and preferences—are weighed when assigning these officers to a CONUS unit. In the last few years, schooling of Reserve officers at the associate advanced course has become an additional major consideration. To school more of these officers, we have been routing many Reserve officers through the associate


advanced level course incident to their CONUS assignment.

More than four thousand officers must be assigned to reserve-component duty to carry out our responsibility to the reserve components, and individuals are carefully selected. Qualifications of professional knowledge, personal conduct, and personality are and must remain high. The benefits derived by the professional officer who serves with reserve components are very great, although sometimes intangible. One such benefit is gaining an understanding of the citizen soldier's approach to Army methods.

Another important type of assignment is duty with MAAGs and missions. In the performance of their duty, personnel of MAAGs and missions are in almost daily contact with leaders of the government, the diplomatic corps, and the armed forces of foreign governments. For this reason, officers selected for these assignments (and their families) must meet the highest standards of professional attainments and social acceptance. In some cases, the officers selected for assignment to these units first attend the Army Language School. To receive such an assignment, you may apply through normal channels or indicate your preference on your preference statement. The tours vary from one to three years.

## Schooling

THE best way to cover this subject is to divide it into two groups: TDY courses and PCS courses. Normally, if





a course is less than five months, it is a TDY course. Longer courses are attended on a PCS basis. DA does not issue orders to TDY courses unless they are incident to permanent changes of station. Therefore, the burden for attending TDY courses such as the associate advanced course, is on the officer and his unit. The officer must make application to the army-area commander for attendance, and unit commanders should encourage application and attendance. One exception is that an application is not required for the CGSC associate course. Attendance at this course is on a competitive basis; all eligible officers are automatically considered, and selections are made by DA.

Now about PCS courses. Selections for these are made by DA. The only ones which require application are specialist courses such as guided missiles staff officer course, and the artillery fire-control systems course. For the other PCS courses consideration is automatic for all eligible officers. We send all Regular officers to the advanced course, but for schools above the advanced level, selection is competitive, and only a percentage of the eligible officers will attend.

**C**OMPETITIVE selection is for the senior service schools: CGSC, Armed Forces Staff College, and War College level schools. The ouija board or the roulette wheel does not give satisfactory results in school selection, and so selections are based on an individual's military record. Since we know, for example, that only about 50 per cent of the Regular officers will attend CGSC, we should select the 50 per cent whose records indicate the greatest potential value to the service. How do we measure this potential? By measuring what an officer has done and how well he has done it. "How well he has done it" is determined from the efficiency record. We consider not only the current OEI, but all previous reports, giving greater weight to the latest ones. To determine the element "what he has done," we consider the amount and level of command duty, staff and instructor duty, troop duty, and combat experience. Actually, every assignment can be and is considered under one or more of these headings. These points on selection bring out several factors: The officer himself is primarily responsible for his selection or non-selection; he

has a direct influence on his efficiency record, and an indirect but still considerable influence on his assignments. This also brings out the need for commanders to provide junior officers with the opportunity to serve in varied assignments.

There is another facet of this competitive selection that all officers should understand. Each Regular officer is placed in what is called a "basic year group." The basic year is normally the same as an officer's basic date of RA commission. (There are exceptions to this general statement, such as competitive tour officers.) From the time a basic year group becomes eligible for school, it gets a quota each year until it passes out of the zone of eligibility. Each basic year group sends approximately the same percentage of its officers to a school during the time it is within the zone of eligibility. Going back to our CGSC example, each year group sends approximately 50 per cent of its officers through Leavenworth by the time it passes out of the zone. This is the only way in which an equitable distribution of quotas can be made.

Competitive selection is neither mysterious nor secretive. Still, many officers come in wanting to know why they have never gone to CGSC. In these cases, the officer's record invariably reflects a lack of outstanding performance as compared with his contemporaries who have attended. The system is as fair as can be devised when dealing with the numerous intangibles that exist in personnel work.

## Other Items

**T**HERE are several topics which are grouped under this heading, not because they are less important, but rather because they do not conveniently fall under either assignments or schools. Some of these topics are specialization, Army aviation, efficiency reports, OEI, and Form 66.

Specialization is here to stay. It is a procedure designed to get more results from our officers. By specialization is meant the recognized fields of specialization in which repetitive assignments are essential in order for the officer to attain a high degree of proficiency. These fields include atomic energy, intelligence, foreign-area fields, research and development, public information, comptroller, and legislative liaison.

As pointed out in TM 20-605,

branch (troop) assignments, including military schools, will be interspersed with assignments in a specialized field. Thus the specialist does not necessarily lose out on the branch-type assignments, but he does have closer supervision over his branch immaterial assignments and a narrower field from which to choose. In all cases, however, the specialist remains branch-qualified through selected branch assignments.

Specialization neither enhances nor lessens an officer's chance of attending a higher military school, and there are no indications that specialization jeopardizes chances for promotion. On the other hand, there are certain general-officer positions that may be filled only by those who have had a highly specialized career in a particular field.

**T**HE Army aviation program is currently growing. Present plans are that Army aviators will receive branch material assignments to insure that they remain branch-qualified. Present indications are that officers who enter the Army aviation program may look forward to a bright future in the Army.

**N**OW for that most important subject—efficiency reports. These reports are used extensively by Career Management Division. Every time any action is taken concerning any officer, whether it be an assignment, consideration for school, or category renewal, his efficiency record is reviewed. It is important that the efficiency report give an accurate and complete description of the officer's abilities, qualifications, and performance of duty. Section XII of the report—"description of the rated officer and comments"—is the appropriate place to enter a complete descriptive paragraph of the officer indicating both strengths and weaknesses as they appear in the officer's normal performance of duty. This section should be original and not a repeat of comments by previous raters or repeat of comments used on a previous report.

Visiting officers sometimes tell us that our copy of their Form 66 is in error. We can keep your Form 66 up to date only when we receive the report of change from your unit. You are responsible for seeing to it that the organizational copy of the Form 66 is correct and the changes are sent to DA.

If you have questions or comments for CMD, you're encouraged to put them in a letter direct to your particular career branch.

newspapers but picture captions and soccer scores."

We conclude with a comment on Army housing by one Col. A. Nedosugov. His is a different approach from any we have heard of in the U. S. Army, and for that we are quite thankful. His complaint was directed at the quartermaster people who, he charged, "worry only about those features of the camp that are likely to impress visiting brass, and build only beautiful fences and pretty houses for themselves, while officers' housing is in terrible shape."

### Medical Notes

¶ There are sound reasons for providing medical care for dependents, and yet, as Maj. Gen. Silas B. Hays, Surgeon General of the Army, recently pointed out, "the number of military personnel presently on active duty plus those dependents who are cared for in Army facilities makes the ratio not the [authorized] three [medical officers] per thousand, but about 1.7 per thousand of population served." He said that as troop strength decreases so does the number of medical officers, but without a similar decrease in the dependent workload. Despite the high rate of resignation from the Medical Service, he is urging all medical installations to furnish as much auxiliary medical service as they can to military dependents "who, of necessity, must obtain medical care from civilian physicians."

¶ The key feature of the new medical care program to be presented to Congress next year by the Department of Defense is a voluntary insurance plan, the cost of which would be split between the Government and the serviceman, with individuals paying no more than 30 per cent of the monthly premium. The bill limits the kinds of medical treatment to be provided or paid for with Government assistance to diagnosis, acute medical and surgical conditions, contagious diseases, immunization, and maternity and infant care. The Surgeon General of the Army has said that while the bill isn't "entirely ideal it will go a long ways to solve the problem" of dependent medical care.

¶ Effective 1 October, the new Chief of the Army Nurse Corps was Col. Inez Haynes, who has been on active duty since 1933.

¶ Male nurses to be commissioned in the Army Reserve


for assignment to the Army Nurse Corps and the Army Medical Specialist Corps will be assigned to duty tour by the same criteria presently governing the assignments of women officers. Male nurses are eligible for the Army Nurse Corps under the provisions of a new law approved by President Eisenhower.

### Press Notes

¶ In the September *McCall's* an article describing the part some of the decent women of Phenix City played in cleaning up their town reveals that Lt. Gen. Robert N. Young, when Commandant of The Infantry School a few years ago, made an incognito tour of Phenix City and later had a few of its more disreputable establishments placed off limits.

¶ From *Soldier*, "The British Army Magazine," we learn that in the U.S. 92d AAA Battalion in England, when a soldier has a birthday the cook bakes him a cake. This is told in an article that describes for the British enlisted men the duties and ways of life of American soldiers in England. Noting that the Americans are told never to call an Englishman a "Limey," the article informs its readers that American soldiers "dislike being called 'GIs'."

¶ The Nike missile and its batteries that ring major U.S. cities got top-notch reportorial treatment from Craig Thompson in *The Saturday Evening Post* for 3 September. "The new Nike comes closer to the supernatural than the old one [the Greek goddess of victory] ever could," he writes. In telling of the trials and tribulations Nike batteries have had in the civilian communities in which they are located, Thompson reserves special praise for the effective community relations Captain L. L. Collis, CO of Battery B, 75th AAA Missile Battalion, built at Upper Marlboro, Md. "In an incredibly short space of time, Upper Marlboro and Battery B have not only come to know each other but to rely on each other for diversion, recreation and friendship. And in bringing this situation about, Collis has provided his men with housing, dates, off-post acquaintances and activities which will help keep them in the easy mental state most conducive to battery efficiency," Thompson wrote.



### At National Matches

The Army did itself proud at the National Matches at Camp Perry, Ohio, this year and among those most proud were these three officers, all vitally interested in good shooting. From left to right: Col. Charles G. Rau, Director of Civilian Marksmanship, USA; Brig. Gen. S. G. Conley, Deputy G3, CONARC; Maj. Gen. Armistead D. Mead, Chief, Infantry branch, CONARC. At far right is Rear Adm. Morton C. Mumma, Ret., president of the National Rifle Association.

## THE MONTH'S BOOKS

### "Truly Brave"

#### PORTRAIT OF PATTON

By Brig. Gen. Harry H. Semmes  
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955  
321 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$6.00

Reviewed by

MAJ. GEN. H. W. BLAKELEY

In a short foreword, Mrs. Ruth Ellen Patton Totten says of this book: "I know no kinder tribute to my father, George Smith Patton, Jr., than that of the man who knew him so long and so well, and who has written of his life with judgment and friendship and understanding. I think of this book as a memorial of inestimable worth to his family, as well as to his profession and to history."

*Portrait of Patton* is clearly of value if only to preserve some of the Patton stories and to get into print hitherto unpublished extracts from his diaries and personal letters. General Semmes (he is a Reserve brigadier general and a Washington lawyer) has shown excellent judgment in his choice of incidents to round out the picture of one of the most colorful characters in the history of the United States Army. There are some confusing departures from chronological presentation chargeable probably to the fact that the author is not a professional writer and is a busy man. On the other hand, he does not distort and exaggerate, as many a professional writer has done, the sufficiently fantastic episodes of the Third Army commander's career.

The problem of separating fact from the fiction that naturally grows up around a unique individualist like Patton must have been a considerable one. In general, it seems to have been adequately met, but this reviewer, who was stationed at Fort Myer when Patton was a major in the 3d Cavalry there, doubts the accuracy of the story that Major Patton put a funeral escort into a gallop en route from Washington's Union Station to Arlington Cemetery with the result that the artillery team pulling the caisson with an officer's body on it ran away.

The established facts of General Patton's life challenge belief, of course. Here was a man who was an accomplished polo player, master of foxhounds, and horse-show competitor who could act as captain and navigator of his yacht in trips, mostly under sail, which covered wide areas of the Pacific. Yet his name will always be associated with tanks. He was a poet, and a weapons designer. He could be rough, rude, and unreasonable—"moody, hot-tempered, and reacting sometimes like a spoiled child," as General Semmes expresses it—and then be charmingly disarming. He was profane and religious. He was a devoted husband and father and a superb host. He was a diarist who wrote down the details of his emotional reactions with the uninhibited frankness of a schoolgirl. Yet he could write of military matters with clarity and conciseness.

The numerous pieces of poetry included in this book are too long to quote even one here, but a few extracts from his letters and diaries will serve to show something of the characteristics which made General Eisenhower say of Patton that "his emotional range was very great and he lived at either one end or the other of it." In a letter to his wife after World War I, he wrote: "The most terrible thing has happened to me. I heard last night that I will not get the DSC. I woke up all last night feeling that I was dying, and then it would occur to me what had happened. I cannot realize it yet. It was the whole war to me, all I can ever get out of two years away from you." But in a 1943 letter, after successes in battle: "I certainly love war." A few days later, after the slapping incident: "I feel very low."

In comparison, it is interesting to note his down-to-earth, encouraging messages to green troops. One paragraph, for example: "You have heard a lot about mines. They are dangerous but far less dangerous than artillery or machine gun fire. The purpose of mines is to delay you. Don't help the enemy by being delayed. You can move forward through a mine field. All you have to do is to look at the

## COMBAT ACTIONS IN KOREA

Infantry—Artillery—Armor

By

Major Russell A. Gugeler

Here is the war in Korea—at the fighting level. The true accounts of outstanding small-unit actions written by a trained soldier-observer and historian from on-the-spot observations and interviews with the men who actually did the fighting. Working as a member of the observer team from the Office of the Chief of Military History, Major Gugeler has made the most of his unique opportunity and material to bring out the drama and boredom, the gallantry and fear, the flashes of brilliance and stupidity which add up to a splendid digest of combat lessons that every soldier should read.

## COMBAT SUPPORT IN KOREA

By

Captain John G. Westover

Medics, engineers and signalmen; ordnance, quartermaster, chemical and transportation corps troops—all are necessary if the front-line soldier is to accomplish his mission. The Korean war put a severe strain on all combat support units. Installations had to move fast and often; terrain and weather taxed men and machines to the limit of endurance. It took courage and ingenuity to get supplies through to combat troops. Captain Westover shows clearly—through interviews with commanders and observers at the unit level—the tremendous job the service units did under pressure and often under fire, and the lessons we can learn from their accomplishments.

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ground. If you see a place where it has recently been moved by a shovel, don't step on it. If you see wires, step over them. Furthermore, there are not enough mines in the universe to cover everything, therefore, they are placed in positions where foolish soldiers are apt to walk; namely along the edges of roads, at the foot of telegraph poles, and in the bottoms of sandy washes where the going is easier. If you move where the going is hard or over rocky ground, you will not meet mines."

From this book comes a portrait of Patton which highlights his emotional nature, his intelligence, and his bravery. His oft-repeated "Don't take counsel of your fears" is established as coming from the fact that as an emotional man he knew fear; as an intelligent man who wanted to be an outstanding military leader he knew that he had to overcome fear. He always did, and was therefore truly brave.

### Good? Yes! Invincible? No!

THE NET THAT COVERS THE WORLD  
By E. H. Cookridge  
Henry Holt & Company, 1955  
288 Pages; Index; \$3.95

Reviewed by  
GERALD TOOKER

From the dust jacket, through the dramatic case studies, to its final paragraph, this book is like an "astonisher" type of oral presentation. It grabs your interest and holds it by a series of stimulating shocks. It covers the organization, methods, and activities of an intelligence and counterintelligence system to which the Soviets have added subversion, sabotage,

forgery, abduction, and assassination.

The author shows that the present system developed from those of the early Tsars. It has been adapted to the needs of a Communist state established through terroristic means and hence is conspiratorial and violent in character. The author maintains the conspiratorial atmosphere and the sense of continuity by using the term "Cheka" (title of the first communized form of the system) throughout the book even when he describes an event that took place when the official name was something quite different.

Some of the more interesting parts of the book are his estimates of the influence of such men as Lenin, Dzerzhinsky (first head of the original Cheka); Yagoda (credited with establishing poisoning as a fine art in the system); Beria; Panyushkin (former ambassador to the United States and now a particularly effective head of the second terrorist directorate of the system).

The author's estimate that the system consists of 250,000 Communist agents and as many as 500,000 collaborators serves to justify the tremendous scope of activities and wide geographic coverage he attributes to the system.

His analyses of the Petrov, Gouzenko, and Khokhlov affairs are noteworthy. The reconstructions of the murders of Trotsky, and Masaryk, and the abduction of Dr. Linse are both informative and gripping.

The story of the atom spies and the activities of Gerhard Eisler, Harry Gold, and Fuchs in the United States, and of Fritjof Enbom, Allan Nunn-May, and Otto John in other countries, effectively brings home the menace of Soviet espionage.

nage of all of the free world institutions.

The author's portrayal of the role of the Rosenbergs should serve to dispel any mushy sentimentality about their executions. The description of the abductions and liquidations mentioned earlier and the author's revelation that Walter Ulbricht and Ernst Wollweber, now in key positions in East Germany, were two of the most effective Communist spies and saboteurs in World War II, should serve to jolt to reality the most confirmed adherents of the theory that if you look away long enough, an unpleasant picture will disappear.

Having described the system and its operations, the writer assesses its successes and failures. His conclusion is:

"Looking back over nearly four decades of Soviet Secret Service work, it is possible to conclude that the really disastrous failures have been concerned not with obtaining information but in interpreting it. . . . The reasons . . . basically are due to the rigidity of the Marxist training and to lack of understanding of the character and way of life of peoples outside the Soviet Union. . . . There is, unfortunately, little consolation to be derived from this weakness since it always carries the danger of precipitate action as a result of unjustified fears."

Some of the conclusions the author draws are:

"At the same time we have to remain aware that every man who comes through the Iron Curtain . . . has been carefully 'vetted' by the Cheka, and . . . may be a secret agent. . . ."

And: "The real answer to the Soviet secret service is not so much the unmask-

## MUCH ADO ABOUT A BOOK REVIEW

**F**OLLOWING the appearance in our July issue of Captain Charles B. MacDonald's highly critical review of *U.S. Marine Operations in Korea; Volume I: The Pusan Perimeter*, by Lynn Montross and Captain Nicholas A. Canzona, The JOURNAL learned that sparks were flying between Army historians in Temporary C and Marine Corps historians across the Potomac in the Navy Annex. Historians are probably as much given to group loyalty and clannishness as other people, and so this phenomenon becomes explainable when we know that Captain MacDonald is a civilian historian in the Army's Office of Military History and that Mr. Montross and

Captain Canzona are historians in the Historical Branch, G3, of the Marine Corps. It must be added that the persons named did not engage in this minor feuding.

Meanwhile, the editors received three letters critical of our review. The most thorough of these was from Mr. Daniel H. Burkhardt of Baltimore, Md., a former marine and a highly respected civic leader in Baltimore. In his lengthy criticism of the review Mr. Burkhardt attempted an item-by-item refutation of what Captain MacDonald had written. We therefore sent his letter to Captain MacDonald who answered it at our request.

In the paragraphs that follow, Mr. Burkhardt's charges are followed by Captain MacDonald's comment. In three cases the Editor has attempted to clarify and amplify the replies by adding certain comments.

### Date and Pages

BURKHARDT. Most of us who have been able to read for more than a year or so check the pages of our books to see if any are missing. Evidently Captain MacDonald has not yet reached this stage. He does have most of the title and credits correct but even here missed the publication year (1955) and the number of pages (271).



ing of spies . . . as the prevention of potential spies from having access to important information. In carrying out this task injustice may sometimes be done in that men and women of integrity are unnecessarily barred from sensitive positions, but this price we must be prepared to pay."

The book is obviously written more for the general reader than for the student of intelligence organization and techniques. Even so, it is quite useful from the latter point of view. Whether it is accurate in all the descriptions and deductions is not too important. It is worth the price and the time required to read it because the book presents a comprehensive picture of a system which, whether you are soldier or civilian, menaces your future.

#### REALISTIC COMBAT TRAINING AND HOW TO CONDUCT IT

By Lt. Col. Robert B. Rigg  
Military Service Publishing Company, 1955  
239 Pages; Illustrated; Index; Cloth, \$3.50,  
Paper, \$2.75

Reviewed by

MAJOR NORMAN H. WAMPLER

Lieutenant Colonel Robert B. Rigg, like you and me has given considerable thought to the business of military training. Unlike you and me however, Colonel Rigg wrote a book about it. This is a short, useful book, well illustrated, which follows a completely serious vein throughout. There are ten chapters, in each of which "realism" and "realistic" are mentioned over and over again. The author stresses the fact that realistic combat training cannot be achieved through imagination alone. It takes, in addition, a

great deal of hard work and perseverance. For example, you might experience considerable difficulty at some posts, even "training" posts, in requisitioning a proposed training area, several old bathtubs and commodes, a sink or two, some burned clothing—all to be used to lend realism to the training area. I gathered, too, that it helps a great deal to have a sympathetic commanding officer.

This book appears at a very appropriate time. It has been two years since Korea. There are quite a number of young officers and NCOs now engaged in training who have not had combat experience. Indeed, there are many others who have had combat experience but who have forgotten those promises they made themselves in combat: that if they ever again had a training mission, this would be stressed, that omitted, and so on. By reading this book, the least one can derive would be fresh ideas.

The author refutes the popular theory that large training areas, where live firing is permitted, are necessary in order to project realism into combat training. He refers to what he calls exploiting a capsule of terrain. If the available terrain is small, so much the better, so long as you maneuver small units over it. And your job of "building" the battlefield is easier. While you may not be able to fire live ammunition, you can still appeal to the senses of smell and sight. The smell of smoke and the sight of blood—real blood—can easily be arranged. Go to the nearest slaughterhouse for the last.

Combat training and how to conduct it emphasizes armor training. However, there is a broader phase of combat training that is not covered. The book reflects

an excellent background of military training by the author, and if you ever read Colonel Rigg's *Red China's Fighting Hordes*, you can detect a connection between the two books.

*Red China's Fighting Hordes* deals with a potential enemy, how he trains, what he thinks, and considerable about his commanders. Colonel Rigg's second book deals with the type of training necessary for combat against him.

This book should be valuable as an aid to anyone engaged in training. It's full of ideas for training, some old, some new. It would be well worth the while of many others, especially those connected with safety, to read this book. From it they could arrive at a far better understanding of what we are trying to accomplish with our training programs.

Colonel Rigg writes in the preface: "This text is a belief, and a practiced need. The lines herein are not meant to be read, alone, but to be lived and practiced by those who choose to prepare realistically for life's most brutal contest." To this thought most of us heartily subscribe.

#### Tommy Atkins

THE BRITISH SOLDIER  
By Colonel H. de Watteville  
G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1955  
242 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$4.00

Reviewed by

COLONEL S. LEGREE

It is rather difficult to believe how far armies have come in the matter of treatment of their soldiers, even in the last seventy-five years. Although Colonel de Watteville writes only of the British soldier, he does remind us that General

MACDONALD. The publication date as given on page 1 of the book is "1954." The book has 259 pages. The index, as indicated in the heading of my review, is in addition to this number.

EDITOR. Captain MacDonald conformed to JOURNAL style in preparing the heading for the review. The 259 pages plus the index total 271 pages. Our copy of the book gives the year of publication as 1954, although the book was not distributed until well into 1955—not unusual in the GPO.

#### Who Made the Mistakes?

BURKHARDT. He states that the book omitted American errors and did not

give the enemy serious consideration. I find that errors are discussed frankly on pages 14, 15, 40-47, 66-67, 70, 95-96 and 99. The enemy is taken seriously enough for a 10,000-word study of arms, units, tactics and commanders; see pages 16-18, 19-36, and 39-40.

MACDONALD. I erred when I noted that "The Americans never made a mistake." I should have said the marines. In most of the instances Mr. Burkhardt notes, someone on a higher level and beyond Marine Corps jurisdiction made the mistakes. I do not believe that I said the enemy was not "taken seriously enough." I did say: "How presumptuous of the 'Asiatic peasants' to challenge us." This,

I believe, reflects the authors' views as contained in this book.

#### Difficulties and Failures

BURKHARDT. Captain MacDonald wrote that American difficulties were painted "lily-white." I find that American hardships and difficulties are treated at length on pages 43, 45-46, 67-68, 96 and 99. He also wrote that "misdeeds and failures" of Marine operations were suppressed. I find no tendency in the book to soften or suppress instances of what Clausewitz called the "friction of war" as they occurred in Marine operations. See pages 63-64, 90-91, 94, 111-112, 115, 119, 123, 128, 131-132, 144, 153, 156, 177-179,

George Washington imposed flogging as a punishment in the Colonial armies. The British soldier could expect flogging for minor infractions as late as the last quarter of the nineteenth century, and being lashed to a gun wheel was a permitted punishment as late as the beginning of World War I.

Probably worse than the physical punishments inflicted upon the British soldier during the last four hundred years of his history was the shame of his calling in the mind of the public. In practically every era of England's history, except during some wars, the soldier was by definition an undependable drunk who would automatically spend any money he received on alcohol. This was the beginning of the custom which still obtains to some extent in our own Army of requiring a noncommissioned officer at least, or even a subaltern, to supervise every little job done by a private.

During a large part of England's history, enlistment was for life—and the life was often short because of poor food, unsanitary conditions, and inadequate clothing. One regiment spent sixty-five years in the West Indies; enlisting in this organization was the same as volunteering for transport for life. If a soldier endured the food, the climate, the uniforms, and punishments of up to 3,000 lashes, and lived to be discharged when too old for service, he could look forward only to stealing or begging, since the guilds and commercial enterprises would have nothing to do with the "licentious soldiery."

With such a background and such a reputation it is hard to understand how the British Army rolled up such a glorious

record over the centuries. The loss of our Revolutionary War was due more to the type of leadership the British soldier had than to his bravery. The large number of Hessians in the British forces added nothing to their staying power, fortunately for us.

The author stresses heavily the role of women as they accompanied the armies in the field and of the heartaches and heartbreaks when the allowance of six wives per company was invoked upon movement of the unit. The conditions under which even "authorized" families lived were rather horrible by today's standards and the junior officers were little better off even up to World War I.

Human values have changed tremendously over the past fifty years, probably more so in the British Army than in our own since apparently we had not the distance to travel.

This book would make grim reading indeed for our present Selective Service enlisted men and it probably would be a good idea to have those who feel they are being abused read what their grandfathers endured.

### Nothing Incomprehensible

U. S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II, The Technical Services:

THE ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT: PLANNING MUNITIONS FOR WAR

By Constance McLaughlin Green, Harry C. Thomson and Peter C. Roots

Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1955

542 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$4.25

Reviewed by

BRIG. GEN. DONALD ARMSTRONG

The time has passed when a history

of a technical branch of the Army would appeal almost exclusively to readers interested in engineering or research or manufacture. No longer does the Ordnance Corps design and produce weapons with little or no reference to the desires of the combat forces. The situation wherein "the services had little say about what equipment they would fight with" came to a desirable end in the 1920s. In those years the users commenced to influence strongly the military characteristics of weapons. This continuing trend makes it not only desirable but highly essential that personnel of the combat forces have some understanding of the extent and purpose of ordnance research and development, of the time element in design and production processes, of the logistical problems involved in the storage and distribution of ordnance matériel.

In this volume of Ordnance history the combat forces will find an accurate and objective historical discussion of these basic aspects of our ability to prevent or win a war. The lessons of history that must be learned by both the producers and users of guns and tanks, small arms and mortars are fairly described and clearly stated. Taken to heart, these lessons will add to our national security. The non-technical reader will find nothing incomprehensible to anyone who finished high school.

The authors examine the sins of omission and commission and the pardonable errors of judgment on both sides of the fence which hampered our ability in the beginning of World War II to equal in some cases the needs of combat. Sometimes the Ordnance personnel appear to

195, 197, 204, 213, 217, 221 and 224.

MACDONALD. I did not say that American "difficulties" were painted lily-white. The latter part of the paragraph in which that word appears makes clear that I was referring to the "errors, the misdeeds and the failures." Perhaps this accounts for the fact that in the references cited I can find few examples of "errors and misdeeds" of marines. The point on page 94 about the "firing at delusions" is duly noted in my review. On page 128, it is true that a Marine officer took a wrong road, but I was limited to 750 words and could not mention every instance. I did note at the time I wrote my review that

Captain Canzona used the wrong fuses in some mines, but I hoped to spare Captain Canzona the embarrassment of calling attention to his having introduced his own name in the text and eliminated it from my final draft. I also did not mention Mr. Montross's use of his own earlier works as sources, one instance of which could certainly have been better served by citing the primary source. It is unfortunate that I used the word "failures." Some are told about, though I fear the explanations made them seem something less than failures.

### Information from Enemy Sources

BURKHARDT. The review states that

references to the enemy were not based on captured enemy material. I find that throughout the book important references to enemy situations, units, arms and tactics are based on FECOM GHQ military intelligence reports derived from enemy sources. In the preface, Lt. Col. Roy E. Appleman, U.S. Army, is credited with having supplied the authors with captured enemy papers. MACDONALD. Mr. Burkhardt should read more carefully. I did not say that references to the enemy were not based on captured enemy material. I said that the enemy information on the maps inside the covers was taken from contemporary G2 maps rather than from captured documents. This

be responsible; sometimes the using services.

For example, take the 37mm antitank gun of the war's beginning. It "was obsolete before it was standardized," the authors write, in comparison to guns of similar purpose in the Soviet Union and Germany. But the authors also remind us that: "the Infantry was insistent that the weight of the gun and carriage together must not exceed 1,000 pounds. This weight limit precluded a gun of larger caliber."

This is the book to read for an impartial and lucid discussion of the controversial subjects of World War II tank design, of self-propelled artillery, of the shaped charge, and of the Garand rifle. It clarifies the considerations involved in mobility and fire power, and offensive and defensive qualities of ordnance matériel. It emphasizes the importance of military intelligence concerning weapons and of the application of these data to the needs of our own Army.

In short, this volume is highly recommended to the readers of this JOURNAL because of its value as an aspect of military history important to combat personnel. It is remarkably readable and it should help to discourage destructive recriminations between producers and users of ordnance matériel and to create a better mutual understanding of each other's problems and limitations.

## Giant in Frenzy

CHINA UNDER COMMUNISM: THE FIRST FIVE YEARS

By Richard L. Walker  
Yale University Press

403 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$4.50

Reviewed by  
LT. COL. PAUL LINEBARGER

Professor Walker of Yale is one of the most brilliant of the younger China experts. He is noted among his colleagues for having dared to criticize Communism among American university people at a time when it was much more fashionable to criticize McCarthy, and he has been distinguished by his willingness to speak up as a citizen despite his dignity as an academician.

*China Under Communism* puts him down, for the rest of his life, as the first American professor to do a serious full-length study of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism holding power on the China mainland. With one immense intellectual step, a step involving considerable moral courage, Walker has become "one of our most respected authorities on China." He has put himself on record.

What is the record?

As to method, the record speaks well for Walker's fastidious care as a scholar. Some of the embattled Leftists will deprecate this detail or that, but it will not be possible for the non-anti-Communist crowd to destroy the mass of detail built up by Walker.

From well-researched fact, from identifiable and traceable documentation, Walker builds up a factual picture which is all the more impressive precisely because it is so well documented. His work has more depth than W. W. Rostow's brilliant work, *The Prospects for Communist China*, though it lacks the capacity for synthesis and comparison shown in the Rostow book; Walker's book does not display the brooding personality in-

tensity of Lord Lindsay's *China and the Cold War*, but Michael Lindsay lived among the Chicomos for years and was a good friend to Mao himself—advantages which Walker, a younger man, has not enjoyed.

Walker's most brilliant accomplishment consists of breaking the Chinese "People's" Government down both operationally and chronologically. He then presents, period for period and function for function, a documented description of what is happening on the mainland. To Walker, 1949 and 1950 were the years of crisis and victory; 1951 was the year of violence; 1952 was the year of regimentation and 1953 the year of retrenchment; and 1954 was the year of decisions.

Walker shows the authoritarian character of the Chinese Communist regime very plainly. He calls the turn in general and in detail in outlining how this government keeps its control over the Chinese people. His chapter on "China and the Soviet Union" is the best of its kind, in that it avoids pompous generalizations one way or the other, but examines the tissue of relationships between the two Red giants.

Every officer who has served in CBI or Korea should read this book. If we add every officer and man who may still have to face the Chinese Communists in battle, we may get a very large roster of readers. Here, at last, is a book by a real China specialist who dares to face up to the tragedy of China as China has become—a giant in frenzy and agony, but still a giant in its long run threat to the world as a whole.

was verified for me by Colonel Appleman, who, as Mr. Burkhardt notes, did provide the bulk of the enemy material to the authors.

## Authors and Critics

BURKHARDT. One of the authors is a military historian of such stature that at least one of his books, *War Through the Ages*, has become a classic. This probably has not come to MacDonald's attention since it is likely he was skipping through something else at the time it was written (1944). Montross is obviously realistic and objective. Captain Canzona, the co-author, won his Silver Star in Korea so can supply authentic battle detail without "reading letters."

MACDONALD. I have respect for Mr. Montross's well-deserved reputation, but I question whether any man's reputation puts his work above criticism. I will admit that I did not learn of *War Through the Ages* in 1944 because I was, as Mr. Burkhardt suggests, "skipping through something else." I also hold great respect for Captain Canzona's combat record in Korea, and I have read several excellent articles in military publications by Captain Canzona. Nevertheless, I do not believe Captain Canzona was present at all the actions described and that therefore he would have been grateful to have had at his disposal interviews taken soon after the action by official historians.

EDITOR. What Captain MacDonald was "skipping through" in 1944 were the European campaigns of the United States Army. As a company commander in the 23d Infantry, 2d Infantry Division, Captain MacDonald romped through the Northern France, Rhineland, Ardennes-Alsace and Central Europe campaigns in 1944-45, earning the Silver Star, Purple Heart, and Bronze Star. Out of this experience he wrote *Company Commander* (1947) of which the *Marine Corps Gazette* wrote: "... a book which every war-time company commander, Army or Marine, will thoroughly enjoy... the first book to delineate adequately the lot of a rifle company in combat."



## A Selected Check List of the Month's Books

*This run-down of some of the books received for review during the month preceding our deadline is to give our readers who like to follow current literature a monthly check list of the most important, useful and potentially popular books. Full reviews of some of these books will appear in this or subsequent issues. Any of these titles may be purchased through the Combat Forces Book Service. See page 64 for order coupon and a complete listing of Selected Books for Military Readers.*

**AIRMAN AT YALTA.** By Gen. Laurence S. Kuter. Duell, Sloan & Pearce—Little, Brown, 1955. 180 Pages; Illustrated; \$3.00. General Kuter's informal and sometimes informative reminiscences of the Yalta Conference, which he attended as senior Army Air Forces representative in the absence of General Arnold.

**ALWAYS INTO BATTLE:** Some Forgotten Army Sagas. By Lt. Gen. Sir George MacMunn. Gale & Polden, 1955. 214 Pages. Fourteen nearly forgotten sagas of the British Army, all prior to World War II. Included is the "true story" of the War of American Independence, unfortunately marred by numerous annoying factual errors, but which documents the interesting fact that the Lord Germaine whose ineptitude was responsible for Burgoyne's surrender was, by change of name, the Lord Sackville who had earlier been cashiered for misconduct at Minden.

**THE AMERICAN CONCEPT OF LEADERSHIP.** By Col. Sherman I. Kiser. Pageant Press, 1955. 234 Pages; \$4.00. A second edition of Colonel Kiser's work, the first edition of which was received with interest by many military reviewers. The concept is based on positive leadership, which itself is based on being attuned to the Universal Mind.

**BADGES ON BATTLE DRESS:** Post-War Formation Signs; Rank and Regimental Badges. By Lt. Col. Howard N. Cole. Gale & Polden, 1955. 218 Pages; Illustrated. The third edition of a now standard text on British unit insignia, rank and regimental badges. A valuable reference work on the subject.

**THE BRITISH SOLDIER.** By Col. H. de Watterville. G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1955. 242 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$4.00. From the Plantagenets to the present, the British soldier has won great respect along with a certain amount of good-natured criticism. This analysis of what makes him tick is good reading, and although loaded in favor of Tommy, is well-researched history.

**CAPTAIN DREYFUS:** The Story of a Mass Hysteria. By Nicholas Halasz. Simon & Schuster, 1955. 274 Pages; Index; \$3.50. Another look at one of the most famous military legal cases of all time. Thriller-like reading, especially for the new generation which hasn't been exposed to much about the case.

**CASE STUDIES IN PERSONNEL SECURITY.** Collected under the direction of Adam Yarmolinski. Bureau of National Affairs, 1955. 310 Pages. Short, factual run-downs on 31 cases affecting government civilian employees, 15 industrial employees, two military personnel, one post-security case, and one employee of an international organization, financed by the Fund for the Republic, Inc. The net effect is to cast some doubt on the personnel and methods used to decide cases under Federal personnel security programs. Happily, there is little editorial comment.

**COMMANDO EXTRAORDINARY.** By Charles Foley. With a foreword by Brig.

Gen. Telford Taylor, USAR. G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1955. 241 Pages; Illustrated; \$3.75. The remarkable exploits of Lt. Col. Otto Skorzeny, hard-boiled German commando who figured in the rescue of Mussolini, in the Battle of the Bulge, the kidnaping of Nicholas Horthy, and other exploits during World War II.

**CRADLE OF CONQUERORS: SIBERIA.** By Erwin Lessner. Doubleday & Company, 1955. 774 Pages; Index; \$7.50. A long and detailed political, military and economic history of a mysterious land that may be one of the keys to the world's future.

**DEFEAT AT SEA.** By C. D. Bekker. Henry Holt & Company, 1955. 222 Pages; Illustrated; \$3.95. A former German Navy officer describes and explains German naval action in World War II, including the triumphs and failures. Readable and informative.

**GUN DIGEST, 1956.** Edited by John T. Amber. The Gun Digest Company, 1955. 288 Pages; Illustrated; \$2.50. The tenth annual edition of what has become a standard text for shooters and gun fans. This time it is larger than ever.

**HIGH ADVENTURE.** By Sir Edmund Hillary. E. P. Dutton & Company, 1955. 256 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$4.50. The conqueror of Everest writes his own story. A gripping one, clearly written, and with much credit to Tenzing.

**HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR: NORTH AMERICAN SUPPLY.** By H. Duncan Hall. British Information Services, 1955. 599 Pages; Index; \$6.30. Covers the major problems of the politics and economy of trans-Atlantic supply in a major war, rather than the flow of supply across the Atlantic. Strategic rather than basic, and of interest primarily to statesmen and high-level planners.

**JEFFERSON DAVIS:** American Patriot, 1808-1861. By Hudson Strode. Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1955. 460 Pages; Index; \$6.75. A biography of the years to 1861, from birth to President of the Confederacy. West Point cadet, colonel in the Mexican War, Representative, Senator and Secretary of War, Davis was a complicated and often misunderstood personality, which fact the author stresses. The first volume of a two-volume work.

**THE NET THAT COVERS THE WORLD.** By E. H. Cookridge. Henry Holt & Company, 1955. 315 Pages; Index; \$3.95. A description and history of the Soviet espionage system, including interesting details on how agents are recruited and kept in line. Of interest not only to specialists in intelligence but to anyone whose duties touch on sensitive information.

**NINE RIVERS FROM JORDAN.** By Denis Johnston. Little, Brown & Company, 1955. 496 Pages; \$5.00. A literate BBC war correspondent's diary that reads like a professional's arty novel. Offers some sidelights on war in general, Americans in particular, and history as it is

written, that will prove both controversial and thought-provoking.

**NUCLEAR AND RADIOCHEMISTRY.** By Gerhart Friedlander and Joseph W. Kennedy. John Wiley & Sons, 1955. 468 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$7.50. A thoroughly revised edition of *Introduction to Radiochemistry*, by the same authors. A college-level text, valuable for those who work in the field.

**OUR SAMOAN ADVENTURE.** By Fanny and Robert Louis Stevenson. Harper & Brothers, 1955. 264 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$4.00. A literary find, three years of Mrs. Stevenson's Samoan diary, with material from Stevenson's *Letters* to round and balance the whole. For Stevenson fans and those interested in literary figures in general.

**PORTRAIT OF PATTON.** By Brig. Gen. Harry H. Semmes. Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955. 308 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$6.00. A Reserve officer, who served with Patton in both World Wars, writes a worshipful and disconnected biography of a great soldier. Lacking in literary policy, but replete with anecdote and incident. This work will aid greatly in estimating one of our outstanding military leaders.

**RECIPES FROM THE EAST.** By Irma Walker Ross. Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1955. 90 Pages; Illustrated; \$1.50. Exotic recipes from Japan, Hawaii, China, the Philippines, India, Russia, and elsewhere, in convenient plastic-bound form, and amusingly illustrated. "Soak shark's fins in warm water for about 10 minutes. . ."

**THE SECRET RAIDERS.** By Davis Woodward. W. W. Norton & Company, 1955. 287 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$3.75. Exciting writing on an important sideshow of the war at sea.

**U. S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II.** The Technical Services. **THE ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT: PLANNING MUNITIONS FOR WAR.** By Constance McLaughlin Green, Harry C. Thomson, and Peter C. Roots. Office of the Chief of Military History, 1955. 542 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$4.25. How World War II's matériel was designed and developed; the usual thorough job of OCMH.

**WORLD PERSPECTIVES. Vol. V: WORLD INDIVISIBLE, WITH LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR ALL.** By Konrad Adenauer. Harper & Brothers, 1955. 128 Pages; \$2.75. Compiled from recent speeches and statements by a courageous and right-minded statesman, this book offers hope that Germany will resist Communist pressures and become a worthy member of the community of nations. The statements are clear and encouraging.

**"YOU'LL DIE IN SINGAPORE!"** By Charles McCormac. E. P. Dutton & Company, 1955. 192 Pages; \$3.50. Another tale of a British POW in Japanese hands, and his escape. A true-life adventure tale, better written than most, and hardly calculated to build sympathy for Japan.



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**T**HE Army and the country have a mutual Dependence upon each other and it is of the last Importance that their several Duties should be so regulated and enforced as to produce not only the greatest Harmony and good Understanding but the truest Happiness and Comfort to each.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

